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INTRODUCTION
Since the attacks on September 11, New York’s subways,
train stations, parks and tourist destinations have been
prowled by police dogs—large, pointy-eared, unnervingly
observant beasts deeply unconvinced of our innocence. They
sniff at backpacks and train their eyes on passersby, daring
1
us to make a move.

Until his retirement in 2011, Franky the Labrador
Retriever worked as a drug-detection dog with the MiamiDade Police Department.2 Because Franky was a friendly
animal, he was deployed extensively in airports, sports
arenas, and other public places.3 During his seven-year
tenure on the force, Franky sniffed out more than 2.5 tons of
marijuana, 80 pounds of cocaine, and almost $5 million in
drug-contaminated currency.4 Recently, Franky’s nose
sparked a legal debate.5 In the fall of 2012, the United

1. Burkhard Bilger, Beware of the Dogs, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2012, at 47.
2. Curt Anderson, Decided By a Nose? Court Ponders
Dog’s Sniff, CHICAGO POST-TRIBUNE (Jan. 3, 2012,
2:24
http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/9794473-418/decided-by-a-nose-courtponders-drug-dogs-sniff.html.

Drug
PM),

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Madison Gray, To Sniff or Not to Sniff? Supreme Court to Decide if
Drug Dog’s Nose Went Too Far, TIME MAGAZINE (Jan. 10, 2012),
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States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Florida v.
Jardines, an appeal from a Florida Supreme Court decision
holding Franky’s sniffs from the front door of a residence
were a Fourth Amendment search.6
Franky is not unique in any way.7 Thousands of dogs
just like him work in police units across the country,
constituting a new omnipresence in the modern surveillance
state.8 These dogs have fundamentally altered the course of
law enforcement in the United States, their widespread use
ushering in a new model of policing.9 Counterbalancing this
ubiquity is the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The courts have assumed different and, at times,
contradictory approaches when considering whether or not
to define the dog sniff as a Fourth Amendment search. Until
now, these approaches have greatly depended upon the
definition of dog sniffs as either a natural biological
occurrence or an advancing technology.10 On one end, some
courts have held that “a dog is not a technology—he or she
is . . . a man’s best friend . . . [a] member[] of [the] family.
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/01/10/to-sniff-or-not-to-sniff-supreme-court-todecide-if-drug-dogs-nose-went-too-far/.
6. Jardines v. Florida, 73 So. 3d 34, 36-37 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 995 (2012).
7. Matheson v. Florida, 870 So. 2d 8, 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Law
enforcement use of narcotics detection dogs has become commonplace.”).
8. See infra Part IV.B.
9. Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, How the War on Drugs Distorts Privacy Law,
64
STAN.
L.
REV.
ONLINE
131,
131
(May
9,
2012),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/war-on-drugs-privacy-law.
10. For the definition of advancing technologies, see Brief for National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil Liberties
Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5-6 Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508) (“Today, technology enables the authorities to
breach secrecy without physical intrusion. At a minimum, a technological
advance that is an effective substitute for physical intrusion and poses the same
threats to privacy should be governed by the Fourth Amendment. A new device
must be constrained by the Constitution whenever it enables officials to learn
any confidential information that previously could have been learned only by
means of physical intrusion.”); Id. at 23 (“[U]nfettered exploitation of tools made
possible by science and technology could destroy constitutional liberties. The
Court announced, and has since refined, a doctrine designed to protect Fourth
Amendment freedoms against ever more powerful surveillance devices.”).
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The same cannot be said of cars, blenders, and thermal
images.”11 On the opposite end, certain other courts have
held that “the officers’ use of a dog is not a mere
improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses
improve vision, but is a significant enhancement
accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory
instrument.”12 When perceived as an advancing technology,
courts have been inclined to define dog sniffs as searches
and are more likely to scrutinize them through the Fourth
Amendment lens. Conversely, if the sniffs are perceived as a
natural extension of the officer’s sense of smell, they are
viewed with “superstitious awe”13 and are therefore unlikely
to be defined as Fourth Amendment searches and to trigger
constitutional protections.
This Article draws on science and technology studies
(STS) scholarship to claim that the courts’ dominant
relationship to the police dog’s work relies on the tacit and
problematic assumption of a nature/human dichotomy, such
that the dog must be located on one side of this dichotomy
or the other. Generally, STS scholarship moves away from
technological determinism and social constructivism to a
more systemic understanding of how technology and society
coproduce each other—namely, how two or more variables
in a system affect and, essentially, create each other.14 In
determining whether certain intrusions amount to a search,
the courts have relied on the now-discredited metaphysics of
nature. By grounding their analysis in a nature/technology
distinction, the courts import a series of satellite concepts—
autonomy, purity, stasis, etc.—into the search inquiry.
11. Fitzgerald v. Maryland, 864 A.2d 1006, 1015 (Md. 2004).
12. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations
omitted).
13. See Illinois v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 662 (Ill. 1994); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 15, 27-28 (1990). There is also a third way of perceiving the sniffs:
as a low-level technology. When viewed from this perspective, the location from
which the sniff was performed takes on heightened importance, as depicted
later in the Article. See infra Part II.E.
14. Sheila Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-production, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE:
THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 2-3 (Shelia Jasanoff, ed.,
2006); see Hans Harbers, Introduction: Co-production, Agency, and Normativity,
in INSIDE THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY: AGENCY AND NORMATIVITY IN THE COPRODUCTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 11 (Hans Harbers ed., 2005).
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Because the police dog enters legal discourse on the side of
the natural, the very analytical structure employed assumes
its inevitable outcome: where an officer’s use of an infrared
detector would surely be a search, the same officer’s use of a
police dog means no search has occurred, no search warrant
is required, no suppression claim will lie, and no conviction
will be reversed.
Applying the insights of STS scholarship to K-9 sniffs, I
contend that rather than placing the police dog in either the
“nature” box or that of “technology,” it should be understood
as existing in both realms—namely, as a “biotechnology,” a
human-nature hybrid and coproduction. But beyond
describing how this socio-legal magic works (“a dog is not a
technology and therefore you will be incarcerated for seven
years”), this Article also makes a few positive and
normative claims. First, I claim that STS scholarship and
contemporary literature on the politics of nature has
rendered the nature/technology binary obsolete. Second, I
argue that an accurate understanding of the cultural
history and socialization of detection dogs precludes their
designation as simply “natural.” Alongside their existence
as living entities, detection dogs are also technologies in
every relevant sense of the term.15 As artifacts, as historical
developments with future potentialities,
and as
biotechnologies—police dogs are humanly crafted means to
humanly formed ends and desires. The “bio” component in
“biotechnology” refers to the dog’s aliveness, which does
nothing to negate its technological aspects but rather
strengthens them. I claim, in other words, that the
Constitution and the practical realization of rights are being
refabricated by many courts on the basis of a categorical
error, plain and simple.
This Article not only dismantles the nature/technology
distinction, but also the division between animals and
humans. Accordingly, my third normative claim is that the
proper unit of constitutional analysis is not simply “the
dog,” but the “dog-handler-trainer-breeder” assemblage.
Acknowledging this will yield the “right” answer by the
courts—namely, that although the police dog is a living and
natural entity, it is also an advancing technology and,
15. The Oxford Dictionary defines technology as “the application of scientific
knowledge for practical purposes.” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1480
(12th ed. 2011).

86

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

therefore, its sniffs should trigger all relevant Fourth
Amendment protections, including a warrant, probable
cause requirements, and remedies in case of a violation.
Broadly, this Article is divided into two halves. The first
half (Parts I–II) provides a detailed review of the relevant
case law regarding dog sniffs from the Supreme Court and
from lower courts, with a focus on the implicit and explicit
relationship of these decisions to the categories of nature
and technology. The second half (Parts III–VII) introduces
and draws on STS scholarship about working animals to
suggest that police dogs are “biotechnologies,” bred and
trained for the purpose of drug detection and referred to
interchangeably as nature and machines by their human
coworkers.
Specifically, Part I sketches the facts of Florida’s
Jardines decision as well as other central United States
Supreme Court cases that bear on the relationship of dogs
to nature and technology. Part II explores these and other
cases in more detail and also studies the oral arguments
before the Supreme Court in the Jardines case on October
31, 2012. These observations set the stage for the definition
and discussion of “biotechnology” in Part III, which provides
an analysis of how the STS literature has approached the
topic of working animals. Part IV focuses on the history of
dogs in human service and, specifically, in the service of war
and detection. Moving from the general history of working
dogs to the more specific history of breeding practices, Part
V focuses on the discourse of pedigree improvement for dogs
and on the methods and criteria for breeding police dogs.
Part VI builds on the demonstrated relationship between
breeding and technological advancement to explore in depth
the particular institutional practices of breeding and
cotraining police detection dogs in the United States. This
part also examines the effects of the perceived infallibility of
detection dogs. Finally, Part VII considers the police
officers’ perception of detection dogs and the fused
relationship between these dogs and machines.
I. A JURISPRUDENCE OF SNIFFS: A REVIEW
A. Franky Goes to Court
On December 5, 2006, Miami-Dade police detectives and
United States Drug Enforcement Administration agents set
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up surveillance outside a house, after getting an anonymous
tip that it contains a marijuana grow operation.16
[Officer] Bartelt arrived with [canine] Franky and the two went
up to the house, where Franky quickly detected the odor of pot at
the base of the front door and sat down as he was trained to do
[for a positive alert]. The sniff [of the house’s exterior] was used to
get a search warrant from a judge. The house was searched and
its lone occupant, Joelis Jardines, was arrested trying to escape
out the back door. Officers pulled 179 live marijuana plants from
17
the house, with an estimated street value of more than $700,000.

Jardines was charged with marijuana trafficking.18 He
was also charged with grand theft for the stolen electricity
that was required to power the extensive marijuana
operation.19 His attorney disputed the search. The sniff
performed by Franky, Jardines’s lawyer argued, was “an
unconstitutional law enforcement intrusion into the
home.”20 The trial judge agreed and suppressed the evidence
seized during the search, but an intermediate appeals court
reversed this decision, concluding that “no illegal search
occurred. The officer had the right to go up to [the]
defendant’s front door.”21 The Florida Supreme Court in
turn reversed the appeals court, ruling that:
Such a public spectacle unfolding in a residential neighborhood
will invariably entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation
and embarrassment for the resident, for such dramatic
government activity in the eyes of many—neighbors, passers-by,
and the public at large—will be viewed as an official accusation of
crime. . . . [T]here is simply nothing to prevent the agents from
applying the procedure in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner,
22
or based on whim and fancy, at the home of any citizen.

16. Anderson, supra note 2.
17. Id.
18. Jardines v. Florida, 73 So. 3d 34, 38 (Fla. 2011).
19. Id. at 37.
20. Anderson, supra note 2.
21. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 38.
22. Id. at 49. Florida’s Supreme Court decision applies only to dog sniffs
conducted outside houses. As one scholar notes:
The court did not invalidate warrantless dog sniffs outside other types
of homes, such as apartments. In fact, the court distinguished Stabler v.
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Jardines has generated considerable attention,
including several amici curiae briefs filed by various states
and organizations in support of Florida’s petition.23 The case
is also being closely monitored by law enforcement agencies
nationwide, which depend on dogs for a wide variety of their
everyday work.24 “If the Florida Supreme Court’s decision is
upheld,” warns an amicus curiae brief in support of Florida,
“it could have a profound chilling effect on law-enforcement
efforts to combat illegal drugs.”25 The brief concludes by
stating that “[t]he Court should instead reverse the
judgment below to ensure that detection dogs retain their

[Florida] (which held that a dog sniff conducted at an apartment door
was not a search) on the ground that an apartment is a “temporary
dwelling,” and not accorded the same status as a genuine “private
residence.”
Joseph Magrisso, Protecting Apartment Dwellers from Warrantless Dog Sniffs,
66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1133, 1144 (2012); see Stabler v. Florida, 990 So. 2d 1258,
1261, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 90 So. 3d 267 (Fla. 2012).
23. Several Amici Curiae briefs were filed in support of petitioner Florida.
See, e.g., Brief for National Police Canine Association and Police K-9 Magazine
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995
(2012) (No. 11-564); Briefs for the States of Texas, Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995
(2012) (No. 11-564); Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012) (No. 11-564); Brief for
Wayne County, Michigan as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Florida v.
Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012) (No. 11-564). On the other hand, the case of
Harris v. Florida, 71 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012),
had less briefs filed in support of the state. See, e.g., Brief for Virginia,
Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Texas, and Utah as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012)
(No. 11-817); Brief for National Police Canine Association and Police K-9
Magazine as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct.
1796 (2012) (No. 11-817); see infra Part II.A (discussing Harris).
24. Anderson, supra note 2.
25. Brief for the States of Texas, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9 Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995
(2012) (No. 11-564).
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proper place at the forefront of state and federal efforts
against the production and distribution of illegal drugs.”26
B. Prior Supreme Court Sniff Cases
In its petition to the United States Supreme Court,
Florida argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision
conflicts with numerous previous rulings by the Court—
United States v. Place in particular—all holding that a dog
sniff is not a search.27 In Place, DEA agents detained a man
at an airport and used a trained narcotics dog to perform a
sniff test on his luggage.28 The Court explained that
although a brief seizure of the man’s luggage was
appropriate, the officers could not conduct a full search of
this luggage without probable cause.29 However, the Court
held that the sniff test at issue was not a search under the
Fourth Amendment because it did not involve opening or
otherwise exposing noncontraband items to public view, and
because it was specifically designed to reveal the presence of
contraband.30 The Court also held that the dog sniff was sui
generis.31 I will return to this decision in the next part of
this Article.
Over a decade later, in Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme
Court again upheld the use of a dog sniff test, this time in
the context of an automobile search.32 The majority opinion
reinforced the Court’s conclusion in Place that an
investigatory technique that only reveals illegal conduct is
not a search under the Fourth Amendment because an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in such
conduct.33 Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion that
26. Id.
27. 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Brief for Petitioner at 3 Florida v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d
34 (2011) (No. 11-564).
28. Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
29. Id. at 706.
30. Id. at 707.
31. Id.
32. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
33. See id.; see also Place, 462 U.S. at 707. The reasonable expectation of
privacy test was set forth by the Supreme Court in its decision Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967). There, the Court considered whether police
use of an electronic listening device attached to the exterior of a public phone
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observed the dangerous precedent established by the
majority’s judgment. In her words, “[t]he Court has never
removed police action from Fourth Amendment control on
the ground that the action is well calculated to apprehend
the guilty.”34
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Souter argued
that the sui generis treatment of the dog sniff test by the
Court is based on the faulty assumption that the sniff test is
infallible, and that it therefore could not expose legal
conduct or property.35 Souter argued, by contrast, that “[t]he
infallible dog . . . is a creature of legal fiction.”36 Although
this argument did not persuade a majority of the Justices in
the automobile context, it remains to be seen whether the
current Supreme Court can be convinced that a sniff test of
a home crosses an important Fourth Amendment line. The
Jardines case will thus provide the Court with the
opportunity to consider whether its previous dog sniff
decisions apply equally in the context of the home, which
has traditionally enjoyed heightened Fourth Amendment
protections.37
booth to overhear Katz’s telephone conversations amounted to a search. See id.
at 348, 350. Shifting from its previous focus on physical trespasses into private
property, the Court announced that the “Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places” and established the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. Id. at
351, 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan’s concurring opinion outlined a twopronged test for deciding the reasonableness of privacy expectations: “[F]irst,
that a person . . . exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is willing to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court made note of Katz in
Illinois v. Caballes: “When an officer observes an object left by its owner in plain
view, no search occurs because the owner has exhibited ‘no intention to keep
[the object] to himself.’” 543 U.S. at 416 n.6.
34. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 411-13 (Souter, J., dissenting); Concerning the Fourth Amendment
Implications of a Police Dog Sniff at the Front Door of a Suspect’s Home,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (Jan. 19, 2012, 11:13 AM),
http://epic.org/amicus/jardines/default.html.
36. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411.
37. See Leslie A. Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?:
Unreasonable Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine To Include Sniffs Of the
Home, 88 OR. L. REV. 829, 890-93 (2009) (discussing the conflict between
recognizing dogs as technology or finding that detection dogs are not advanced
technology) (Lunney is now known as Leslie Shoebotham); see also California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not
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C. Does Geography Matter? From the Home to the Airport
via the Car
In a major ruling from 2001, the Supreme Court
concluded “that police could not use thermal imaging
technology to detect heat from marijuana grow operations
from outside a home because the equipment could also
detect lawful activity.”38 “We have said that the Fourth
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the
house,’” the Court ruled in Kyllo v. United States.39 Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia noted that the thermal
device could detect such intimate details as “at what hour
each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and
bath.”40 Also in Kyllo, Justice Scalia first introduced the
“general public use” test, implying that the government may
use technologies that are in general public use to conduct a
warrantless search of a home.41
extend to “public navigable airspace”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 505 (1983)
(holding that it would be “feasible to investigate the contents of . . . bags in a
more expeditious way” through the use of drug-sniffing dogs); Abigail Brown,
Something Smells Afoul: An Analysis of the End of a District Court Split, 36
NOVA L. REV. 201, 206, 220 (2011) (arguing that Kyllo should not be applied to a
dog-sniff case and raising questions about whether a dog is a technology,
whether a dog is in public and general use, and whether a dog sniff is a physical
intrusion of a home).
38. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001); Anderson, supra note 2.
39. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (2001) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590
(1980)).
40. Id. at 29, 38; see also Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485,
487-89 (2009) (critiquing the “lady of the house” test set forth in Kyllo as being
problematically paternalistic).
41. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use.”) (citations omitted). For criticisms of this
test, see id. at 46-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Despite the Court’s attempt to
draw a line that is ‘not only firm but also bright,’ the contours of its new rule are
uncertain because its protection apparently dissipates as soon as the relevant
technology is ‘in general public use.’ Yet how much use is general public use is
not even hinted at by the Court’s opinion, which makes the somewhat doubtful
assumption that the thermal imager used in this case does not satisfy that
criterion. In any event, putting aside its lack of clarity, this criterion is
somewhat perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow,
rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily
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Jardines will provide the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to articulate two alterations in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.42 First, the Court might expand
the trespass rationale recently articulated by Justice Scalia
in United States v. Jones.43 There, the Court held that
federal authorities’ attachment of a Global Positioning
System (GPS) device to a vehicle, and its use to monitor the
vehicle’s movements for twenty-eight days, was a search
under the Fourth Amendment.44 The Court explained that
the “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to commonlaw trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th
century.”45 With this historical foundation in mind, the
available.”) (citations omitted); see also Ken Lammers, Canine Sniffs: The
Search That Isn’t, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 845, 852-53 (2005) (distinguishing
between Caballes and Kyllo in the context of dog sniffs); Lunney, supra note 37,
at 855. Lunney argues that “canine sniffs of the home are ‘searches’ within the
Fourth Amendment and, similar to the thermal imager warrants required after
Kyllo, must be supported by a dog sniff warrant.” Id. at 834. The author also
suggests that courts that focus only on the illegality of the item misapply Kyllo’s
standard. Id. at 867-68. She notes that Kyllo distinguished between advancing
and routine technology, holding that a warrant is not required when the routine
technology is in general public use. See id. at 900-01. Lunney then determines
that “[a] canine sniff of the home is problematic both because of its intrusiveness
and because it implicates the privacy concerns expressed in Kyllo. Therefore, a
canine home-sniff is a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment and must be
treated accordingly.” Id. at 902. My argument in this Article is very much in line
with Lunney’s, except mine offers a broad analysis of the inseparability of
nature and technology and relies on interdisciplinary literature.
42. See Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131.
43. 132 S. Ct. 945, 952-53 (2012).
44. Id. at 948-49. Justice Scalia’s opinion explains that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to protect against government trespass upon physical
areas, limited to “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Id. at 949. The use of a
GPS tracker on a vehicle to monitor the vehicle on public roadways constituted
a search because of its intrusion on an “effect” rather than an unprotected
physical entity. Id. at 950. The government physically trespassed into the
defendant’s private property for the purpose of obtaining information. Id. at
951-52.
45. Id. at 949-50 (citations omitted); see also id. at 950 (“[F]or most of our
history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern
for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it
enumerates.”) (citations omitted); id. at 951 n.5 (“A trespass on ‘houses’ or
‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to
obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless
it is achieved by such a trespass or invasion of privacy.”).
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Court reasoned that federal agents had “encroached on a
protected area” of Jones’s vehicle when attaching the GPS
device.46 Thus, the installation of the GPS amounted to a
“classic trespassory search” under the Fourth Amendment. 47
A favorable outcome for Jardines would reinforce the notion
that, despite the lack of physical trespass in this case, and
because “the home is a formidable privacy fortress,” all
information contained within its walls should be protected
“from government detection unless that information is
knowingly exposed to the public.”48 Such a favorable
outcome would expand Jones’s narrow trespass grounds and
reinstate Katz.49
Second, Jardines will provide the Supreme Court with
the opportunity to revisit its previous dog sniff decisions,
mainly United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes.50
These cases have protected dog sniffs from constitutional
scrutiny by holding that sniffs of luggage and vehicles,
respectively, did not constitute searches.51 The reasoning
behind both holdings is simple: because the dog sniff can
disclose only the presence or absence of illegal narcotics, “a
search incident to a dog’s [positive] alert cannot offend
reasonable expectations of privacy,”52 mostly because society
should not be willing to recognize such privacy interests.53
Specifically, in Caballes, the Court found that the use of a
46. Id. at 952.
47. Id. at 954.
48. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131.
49. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 42 (2001) (citations omitted)
(explaining that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”).
50. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 131; see David A. Sklanski, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and
Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 150 (2002) (“[I]nvestigative tactics that are not
deemed searches or seizures escape judicial review altogether under the Fourth
Amendment.”).
52. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131.
53. Namely, this pertains to the objective prong in Katz. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Sklanksi explains that the
Court tends to rely more on the objective prong of the Katz test because of the
odd consequences that transpire from relying on the subjective prong. Sklanski,
supra note 51, at 157 (explaining that the subjective prong “has the odd
consequence that people who suspect the government are spying on them may
lose, for that every reason, much of their protection against what they fear”).
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trained narcotics dog subsequent to a lawful traffic stop did
not infringe on the expectation of privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment.54 In a concurring opinion in Place,
Justice Blackmun argued that a dog sniff could be
considered a “minimally intrusive” search and justified in
certain circumstances based on the already-existing
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.55 His rationale was
that because a suspicion already exists that the suspect has
contraband, there is less likelihood of a false alert by the
dog.56
D. Criticisms of the Supreme Court’s Sniff Jurisprudence
The narrow test prescribed by the Supreme Court in
Place57 (and, subsequently, in Caballes58) has been subject to
extended criticism. One such criticism is that using canine
sniffs as investigative techniques may threaten individual
liberties, and that they are not sufficiently guarded by
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.59 Another critique of
Place is that it ignored the context of the search and did not
acknowledge the differences between sniffs of a person and
sniffs of an object.60 Place dealt with an object (luggage) and
not a person, which might explain this decision.61 Still
others have criticized Place’s interpretation of privacy,
arguing that odors can be highly intimate and that dogs
often engender anxiety and fear.62 Finally, critics have
54. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); cf. George M. Dery III, Who
Let the Dogs Out? The Supreme Court Did in Illinois v. Caballes by Placing
Absolute Faith In Canine Sniffs, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 378 (2006).
55. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 723 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
59. See, e.g., Amanda S. Froh, Rethinking Canine Sniffs: The Impact of Kyllo
v. United States, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337, 354 (2002–2003).
60. Id. at 354.
61. Id. at 353-54.
62. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A drug-detection
dog is an intimidating animal.”); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a
Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1246-47 (1983) (“[T]he
very act of being subjected to a body sniff by a German Shepherd may be
offensive at best and harrowing at worst to the innocent sniffee.”); Jon S.
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pointed out that police dogs often alert when drugs are not
present, resulting in unnecessary and suspicionless
searches.63 Along these lines, Jane Yakowitz Bambauer
argues that what is “[c]uriously missing from any Supreme
Court opinion is a reflection on how contraband-detecting
dogs fundamentally change law enforcement” in the United
States.64 Although “[p]olice dogs are old technology, their
widespread use ushers in a new model of policing,” she
argues.65 She also notes that “[l]ike pattern-based data
mining, dog sniffs produce tradeoffs inherent in dragnetstyle law enforcement. They redistribute the burden of
unproductive searches from the few-but-stereotypically
‘suspicious’ to the entire population.”66
Vernick et al., Technologies to Detect Concealed Weapons: Fourth Amendment
Limits on a New Public Health and Law Enforcement Tool, J.L. MED. & ETHICS,
Dec. 2003, at 567, 571 (“‘[T]he body and its odors are highly personal’ and ‘dogs
often engender irrational fear.’”) (citation omitted); see also Timothy C. Stone,
State v. Rabb: Dog Sniffs Close to Home, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1123, 1145 n.12
(2006) (noting that dog sniffs can be “intrusive”).
63. Froh, supra note 59, at 355.
64. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131.
65. Id.
66. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131-32; see also Robert Bird, An Examination
of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 KY. L.J. 405,
430-31 (1997). Bird’s analysis can serve to explain Bambauer’s dense statistical
statement in the main text. In his words:
The use of statistical analysis reveals that even a very high accuracy
rate can produce an unreasonable amount of false positives under
certain conditions [in a random population]. . . . [S]uccessful canines
will have difficulty establishing high accuracy rates on their own, and
will likely be most successful when used in tandem with the suspicions
of law enforcement. Therefore, narcotics detection dogs are most
reliable against an individual item or person where police first
suspected the presence of narcotics before using the drug dog. During
such a search, the relevant population sniffed will already have been
narrowed by police expertise. Traffic stops, questioning of suspicious
individuals, and examinations of suspect packages exemplify this type
of narrowing, and courts should more readily rely on dog alerts in these
settings. Canines are less reliable when police use less of their own
expertise. This reasoning applies to sniffs directed at a suspicious
locale, such as an airport or border crossing, rather than a person or
item. These sniffs retain some qualities of individualization: police are
monitoring suspicious areas. However, the dogs are sniffing in a
somewhat random manner and searching for narcotics over a large
area. Here, courts should accept only well-trained canines as reliable
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Congruent with this line of critique, I contend that the
Supreme Court’s sniff jurisprudence is grounded in a
cultural, historical, and conceptual misconception. Although
it does so only implicitly, the Supreme Court essentially
relates organic beings and artificial technologies as two
independent and dichotomous categories: one strongly
situated in nature, the other in society.67 This
nature/culture schism translates into the judicial realm as
follows. On the one hand, that which is natural is
constructed by the Court as less invasive, less
sophisticated,68 and having less of a “creeping” potential.69
drug detectors because the sheer number of items examined can trigger
unacceptable false alerts.
Id. at 427, 430 (citations omitted). The importance of teamwork for successful
detection supports my claim in this Article that the dog does not operate
independent of human influence and that, at the very least, this human
influence should be subject to judicial scrutiny.
67. See infra Part II.D; see, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Florida v.
Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012) (No. 11-564) [hereinafter “Transcript of Oral
Argument, Jardines”] (“So you have to treat him like a guy, to think that he is
not like technology in terms of augmenting what a human being can do.”).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012); Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2001) (“Reversing that approach would leave
the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology. . . . [T]he rule we adopt
must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 142 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he use of techniques like the dog sniff at issue in Place
constitutes a search. . . . The same would be true if a more technologically
sophisticated method were developed to take the place of the dog.”); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[A] canine sniff. . . . is much less
intrusive than a typical search”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Transcript
of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 17-18 (“[T]his isn’t a case where if
you allow a dog to sniff today, he might use x-ray vision in the future. That’s not
going to happen.”).
69. The term “surveillance creep” was first used by the Weberian French
sociologist and legal scholar Jacques Ellul. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964). Ellul points to what he calls “la technique”: a
cultural orientation toward means rather than ends, which makes the insertion
into social life of many artifacts and technical processes seem desirable. La
technique is already an “unnatural” construct, but it is characteristic of human
society rather than simply industrial society: “technique is absorbed into man’s
psychology and depends upon that psychology and upon what has been called
technical motivation.” Id. La technique “constructs the social world that the
machine needs, feeding on itself and expanding in an all-embracing and usually
irreversible fashion.” See also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW
52 (2007) (“Ellul was among one of the first to note the effects of technologized
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Therefore, this practice is usually deemed a nonsearch that
does not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.70 On the
other hand, that which is labeled an advancing technology—
for example, the infrared machine in Kyllo71 or the GPS
device in Jones72—is depicted by the Court as actually or
potentially invasive and thus in need of checks, balances,
and regulation.73 Along these lines, the Supreme Court has
incorrectly insinuated that police dogs are organic creatures
that are familiar and familial.74 Implicit in this paradigm is
the reasoning that a dog, even when performing the same
task as a nonorganic device, is actually doing something
different; it is simply performing its natural, God-given75
thing: breathing.76 The machine, on the other hand, is
perceived as an estranged “other” constructed by humans
and, as such, triggering a range of Fourth Amendment
policing; it requires that more and more be supervised in the hope of
apprehending more effectively those who violate the rules and laws. La
technique in police work steadily and increasingly puts everyone under subtle
surveillance.”). Lyon draws on Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari to characterize
surveillance creep as “rhizomic; more like a creeping plant than a central tree
trunk with spreading branches.” See David Lyon, Surveillance After September
11, SOC. RES. ONLINE 6.3, 2001.
70. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (“[T]he use of a well-trained
narcotics-detection dog . . . generally does not implicate legitimate privacy
interests.”)
71. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
72. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962-63 (Alito, J., concurring).
73. See id. at 962 (implying that Katz is not sufficiently capable of addressing
the dangers and complexities of advanced technology cases and speculating that
“concern about new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation
to protect against these intrusions”).
74. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 719 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that dog sniffs are at least as intrusive as certain
electronic detection devices but stating that “[o]bviously, a narcotics detection
dog is not an electronic detection device”).
75. The argument of the canine as a God-given entity was stressed repeatedly
by counselor for the state in the Jardines arguments. See infra note 172 and
accompanying text.
76. Florida v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1, 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 995 (2012) (noting that “[a] dog's nose is not, however, a ‘device,’” and
suggesting that this is the reason why dog sniffs are considered sui generis).
This also explains why the petitioner in Jardines repeatedly characterizes the
dog sniff as “breathing” or obtaining information “merely by breathing.” Brief of
Petitioner at 14, 21, 28 Florida v. Jardines, 132 S Ct. 995 (2012) (No. 11-564).
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protections.77 Counter to such reasoning, this Article argues
that the contraband detector dog is both natural and
breathing and also very much a sophisticated and
increasingly advancing technology, produced by humans for
human ends.
E. Jacobsen’s “Yes/No” Scope
At this stage, I would like to pause on the facts and
decision in United States v. Jacobsen.78 Although this case
involved a chemical test rather than a dog sniff, the Court
nonetheless applied the logic of Place in its ruling.79 Of all
Supreme Court cases, Jacobsen most clearly brings to light
the slippery slope—the interchangeability, even—between
K-9s and mechanical surveillance techniques.
In Jacobsen, federal drug enforcement agents were
alerted by private freight workers to a parcel, consisting of a
cardboard box wrapped in brown paper, which contained a
tube made of duct tape.80 The workers had opened the tube
to reveal plastic bags of white powder.81 The agents, who
had later arrived to the scene, removed one of the bags,
opened it, and performed a field test that identified the
substance as cocaine.82 The Court found the removal of the
contents of the package by the agents was reasonable83 and
that the chemical field test was not a search.84 The Court
also found United States v. Place to be controlling and
analogous, stating that the chemical test, just like the dog
sniff, only revealed whether contraband was present.85 “It
could tell [the officer] nothing more, not even whether the
77. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 109 (1984); see also Fitzgerald v.
Maryland, 864 A.2d 1006, 1011-12 (discussing Jacobsen and City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)).
79. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121-23.
80. Id. at 111.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 112.
83. Id. at 121-23.
84. Id. at 124-25 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
85. Id. at 122.
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substance was sugar or talcum powder,” the Court
explained.86 The Court then held that due to the test’s
narrow scope, it “does not compromise any legitimate
interest in privacy.”87
More broadly, Jacobsen held that there is no privacy
interest in contraband: “Congress has decided . . . to treat
the interest in ‘privately’ possessing cocaine as illegitimate;
thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a
substance is cocaine, and no other arguably ‘private’ fact,
compromises no legitimate privacy interest.” 88 The Court
rejected Jacobsen’s attempt to distinguish Place on a theory
that the physical examination of his effects was more of an
intrusion than the dog’s exterior sniff, stating that “the
reason [Place’s sniff] did not intrude upon any legitimate
privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could
reveal nothing about noncontraband items. That rationale
is fully applicable here.”89 Read together, Place and
Jacobsen establish that there is no search when government
officials are legally present in a location, and when
government action reveals only whether contraband is
present or not. This rationale is also the state’s central
argument in the pending case of Jardines: Franky’s sniff
“detects only contraband and because one does not have a
‘legitimate’ privacy interest in contraband, a dog sniff is not
a search under the Fourth Amendment.”90
The dissent’s opinion in Jacobsen is as important for my
purposes as that of the majority. In their dissent, Justices
Brennan and Marshall warned that the Place Court “was
dangerously incorrect,” and that the majority’s reasoning in
Jacobsen “is fundamentally misguided and could potentially
lead to the development of a doctrine wholly at odds with
86. Id.
87. Id. at 123.
88. Id. This test is in line with the Court’s statement that “the ‘reasonable
person’ test presupposes an innocent person.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
438 (1991).
89. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 n.24.
90. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9, 11, Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct.
995 (No. 11-564); see also United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir.
2005) (“[T]he majority of our sister circuits . . . have held that canine sniffs used
only to detect the presence of contraband are not Fourth Amendment
searches.”).
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the principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment.”91 In the
dissent’s words:
Combining this approach with the blanket assumption, implicit in
Place and explicit in this case, that individuals in our society have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the fact that they have
contraband in their possession, the Court adopts a general rule
that a surveillance technique does not constitute a search if it
92
reveals only whether or not an individual possesses contraband.

A crucial component of the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Place and Jacobsen is their focus on the limited scope and
nature of the test93—rather than on the nature of the object
tested—in determining whether a legitimate privacy
interest exists.94 Such a conclusion is supported by City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond.95 While holding a highway
checkpoint program designed to discover and interdict
illegal narcotics unconstitutional, the Supreme Court noted
that the program’s use of dogs to sniff the outside of
automobiles was in fact constitutional.96 The Court wrote:
Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of an automobile does not
require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any
information other than the presence or absence of narcotics. Like
the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by a dog that simply walks around a
97
car is “much less intrusive than a typical search.”

The three dissenting justices in Edmond agreed with the
majority that, “[w]e have already held, however, that a ‘sniff
test’ by a trained narcotics dog is not a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not
require physical intrusion of the object being sniffed and it
does not expose anything other than the contraband

91. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 137.
93. This is also referred to as the “limited disclosure theory.” See Stone, supra
note 62, at 1125 n.13.
94. See Froh, supra note 59, at 343-47 (suggesting two situations in which “no
search” exists: when there is no reasonable expectation of privacy or the
intrusion is limited).
95. 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000).
96. Id. at 40, 48.
97. Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
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items.”98 Both the majority and the dissent in Edmond thus
focused on the narrow “yes/no” scope of the sniff rather than
on the identity of the sniffed object—the exterior of the
luggage in Place and the car in Edmond.99 The only relevant
spatial determination by the Court involved whether or not
the dog was legally present outside the sniffed object.100
This Part reviewed the relevant Supreme Court
decisions that apply to dog sniffs. Although the Court did
not explicitly analyze the status of dogs from a nature
versus culture perspective, this dichotomy underscores its
K-9 decisions. The next Part will focus on lower court
decisions on dog sniffs, which more boldly and explicitly
discuss the nature versus culture status of this creature.

98. Id. at 40; id. at 52-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983)).
99. This idea has also been referred to as the “binary search doctrine.” See
Constitutional Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 169, 179, 185-86 (2005). The term
“binary” was first used in United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir.
1989), where the court stated: “[a]s in Place, the driving force behind Jacobsen
was the recognition that because of the binary nature of the information
disclosed by the sniff, no legitimately private information is revealed . . . .”; see
also Chris Blair, Illinois v. Caballes: Love Affair With a Drug-Sniffing Dog, 41
TULSA L. REV. 179, 179-80, 187-90 (2005) (describing the case of Illinois v.
Caballes and arguing that the Court’s analysis of dog sniffs in that case has led
to a far-reaching conclusion about reasonable expectations of privacy); Ric
Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make
the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411, 413-14 (2005)
(explaining the Fourth Amendment’s binary search doctrine, including the
decision in Illinois v. Caballes, and identifying two questions that the Court
“forgot” to answer: what types of surveillance qualify as binary searches and
what limits should be placed on such searches).
100. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40-41. More generally, the dissent notes that the
past decisions of Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) and
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) stand for the notion that
suspicionless roadblock seizures are only constitutional if done according to a
plan that limits officer discretion when conducting the stops. Edmond, 531 U.S.
at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent notes that the past two
cases may have been incorrectly decided because the framers would not have
considered indiscriminate stops of random people to be reasonable. Id.
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II. THE DOG: A MAN’S BEST FRIEND—OR A TECHNOLOGY?
A. Back to Jardines and Harris
The two recent Florida Supreme Court cases, Jardines
v. Florida101 and Harris v. Florida,102 raise two different, yet
interrelated, questions regarding canine police practices:
first, whether the Supreme Court’s prior decision that a
sniff is a nonsearch applies in all circumstances, including
sniffs from the curtilage of a home;103 second, whether the
canine’s positive indication of narcotics suffices to establish
probable cause for a search if the dog is reliable, and what
type of proof is required to establish such reliability.104
101. 73 So. 3d 34, 36 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012).
102. 71 So. 3d 756, 758 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012).
103. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 36-37.
104. Harris, 71 So. 3d at 758. In Harris, the Florida Supreme Court held that
“[t]he State’s presentation of evidence that the dog is properly trained and
certified is the beginning of the analysis.” Id. at 771. In addition to
demonstrating proper training and certification, the court required that the
state keep and present records of the dog’s performance in the field, including
the dog’s successes (alerts where contraband that the dog was trained to detect
was found) and failures (“unverified” alerts where no contraband that the dog
was trained to detect was found). Id. at 771, 775. Finally, the court required
that the state present evidence as to the experience and training of the officer
handling the dog. Id. at 775. Under a “totality of the circumstances” analysis,
the court then considered the evidence and evaluated the dog’s reliability. Id. at
766-67. The brief Florida submitted sought certiorari from the Supreme Court to
resolve the dog sniff issue and to provide a bright line rule on this matter. See
Brief for Petitioner at 8-10 Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012) (No. 11817). The state’s criticism of the Florida Supreme Court is based on the high
evidentiary burden that it places on the state to show evidence of dog statistics,
its argued misconception of the requirement for probable cause, the conflict with
Supreme Court precedents on this matter, and the lack of independent and
adequate state grounds. Id. at 9-10. The brief quotes from the Supreme Court to
say that: “[t]he courts are not strangers to the use of trained dogs to detect the
presence of controlled substances.” Id. at 20 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 505-06 (1983)). The state also notes that bloodhound evidence has been
looked upon favorably for centuries. See id. at 16-18, 22 (discussing United
States v. Ludwig¸10 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1993)). The brief also argues that
courts have agreed that a trained narcotics detection dog’s positive indication
alone is enough to establish probable cause if the dog is reliable. Id. at 19-20; see
also United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United
States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 749 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Kennedy,
131 F.3d 1371, 1376-77 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148,
153 (6th Cir. 1996); and United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 638 (9th
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Underlying these two questions, however, is a third
question that has not yet been addressed, at least not
explicitly so, by the Supreme Court: is the police dog a
Cir. 1993)). Arguing in support of Florida, the amicus curiae briefs state that
the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Harris has caused a “deep split” of
authority among the various courts. Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1 Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 1796
(2012) (No. 11-817). On the one hand, federal courts have granted much power
to canine sniffs. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 505-06 (1983) (stating
that a positive alert from a dog sniff would have resulted in the defendant’s
justifiable arrest on probable cause); United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 213
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the canine’s alert when sniffing the exterior of the
vehicle gave the officer probable cause to search the vehicle); United States v.
Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 2003) (ruling that the dog’s alert in
the bus provided reasonable suspicion that defendant possessed the drugs that
the dog sensed). On the other hand, in Oregon v. Foster, 252 P.3d 292 (Or. 2011),
the Oregon Supreme Court qualified that an alert by “a properly trained and
reliable drug-detection dog can be [the] basis for probable cause to search,” and,
if at issue, is to be reviewed by individualized inquiry based on the totality of
the circumstances. Id. at 294; see also Oregon v. Helzer, 252 P.3d 288, 289 (Or.
2011) (holding that state did not meet its burden in demonstrating that dog’s
sniff was reliable). Some circuit courts have ruled, accordingly, that “[c]ourts
have not definitively addressed the issue of the quality or quantity of evidence
necessary to establish a drug detection dog’s training and reliability.” United
States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1994); cf. South Dakota v. Nguyen,
2007 SD 4, ¶ 16, 726 N.W.2d 871, 876 (noting three divergent views on the
reliability of dog sniffs). Nonetheless, most jurisdictions have concluded that “[a]
drug detection dog is considered reliable when it has been trained and certified
to detect drugs.” See, e.g., United States v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir.
2010). The Seventh Circuit held, for example, that statements that a “dog
‘graduated from a training class in drug detection’ and ‘has proven reliable in
detecting drugs and narcotics’” on prior occasions were sufficient to establish
probable cause. United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22, 27 (7th Cir. 1980). The
factors considered by trial courts include the dog’s training and certification, its
successes and failures in the field, the experience and training of the officer
handling the dog, and the canine’s training and track record, with emphasis on
the amount of false negatives and false positives the dog has furnished. See
United States v. Delaney, 52 F.3d 182, 188 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]here is no legal
requirement that [an] affidavit specify the number of times the dog previously
has sniffed out drugs . . . .”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Nguyen, 2007
SD 4, at ¶¶ 17-19, 726 N.W.2d at 876-77; Tennessee v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762,
768-69 (Tenn. 2000). The amicus curiae brief in Harris warns that “[t]he
potential for varied and inconsistent applications raises serious questions
regarding whether the ‘deterrent effect’ of canine detection outweighs the
proportional ‘harm to the justice system.’” Brief for the Commonwealth of
Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14 Florida v. Harris,
132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012) (No. 11-817) (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 147-48 (2008)).

104

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

technology? Although this question may seem at best
marginally connected to the two questions soon to be
decided by the Supreme Court, the way that various courts
have approached it in the past—either implicitly or
explicitly—has been instrumental in forming their decisions
and will likely also be instrumental in forming the Supreme
Court’s holding in the two Florida cases.
On the one hand, if the dog, who has aided man for
centuries and who, “unlike humans, [does] not
prevaricate,”105 is considered a natural extension of the
human senses—namely, a biological and not a mechanical
entity—the Court is more likely to decide that the dog sniff
is not a search, and thus that it does not require Fourth
Amendment protections. On the other hand, defining police
dog sniffs as a technology will likely trigger more stringent
Fourth Amendment protections, eliciting a different line of
precedent (mainly Kyllo) and resulting in a more detailed,
statistical, and even scientific inquiry into the particular
device in question and, in this case, the specific canine,
sniff, and handler.
B. Human Senses—and Their Extension
It has long been established that the police are not
expected to “shield their eyes when passing by a home on
public thoroughfares.”106 They are similarly not expected to
105. Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 10 Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012) (No. 11-817).
106. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). In this case, the police
received an anonymous tip that defendant was growing marijuana in his
backyard. Id. at 209. Since it could not be observed easily from the ground
because of a tall fence, the police secured a plane and flew over defendant’s
house to observe the yard. Id. The flyover confirmed the presence of marijuana.
Police then obtained a search warrant and seized the marijuana. Id. The
defendant argued that the search by flyover was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 211. The Supreme Court found that the naked-eye
observation from the plane did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 215. The
Court held:
The observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took
place within public navigable airspace . . . in a physically nonintrusive
manner; from this point they were able to observe plants readily
discernible to the naked eye as marijuana. That the observation from
aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the officers were
trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. Such observation is
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shield their hands from touching, or their noses from
smelling, what the public can touch and smell.107 Indeed,
“[s]ensory perception has traditionally been an inextricable
part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”108 For example, a
policeman’s sense of smell—performed from a legal
standpoint—can establish probable cause for a lawful
search or seizure.109 A dog’s sense of smell operates very
much like that of a human’s, except it is much stronger. In
fact, “[i]f laid out, the surface area of a dog’s olfactory cells
would cover a space equivalent to the skin area of the dog’s

precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant.
Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down
could have seen everything that these officers observed. On this record,
we readily conclude that respondent's expectation that his garden was
protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an
expectation that society is prepared to honor.
Id. at 213-14. The Court also held that “[t]he Fourth Amendment simply does
not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a
warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.” Id. at 215.
107. But see Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337, 339 (2000)
(distinguishing that “Ciraolo [is] . . . different from this case because [it]
involved only visual, as opposed to tactile, observation. Physically invasive
inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection”). The Bond
court considered two questions. First, whether the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Id. at 337. The Court found that by using an opaque bag
and placing the bag directly above his seat, the defendant indeed established an
expectation of privacy. Id. at 336-38. Second, the Court considered whether the
individual’s expectation of privacy was one that society would recognize as
reasonable. Id. at 338. Here, the Court found that although the defendant had
an expectation that his bag would be handled, he did not reasonably expect that
his bag would be felt in an exploratory manner. Id. at 338-39. Thus, the physical
manipulation of the defendant’s bag violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 339.
See David S. Rudstein, “Touchy” “Feely”—Is There a Constitutional Difference?
The Constitutionality of “Prepping” a Passenger’s Luggage for a Human or
Canine Sniff After Bond v. United States, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 199-200 (2001).
108. Stone, supra note 62, at 1123.
109. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853-55, 1858 (2011) (holding that
the smell of marijuana, coupled with the noise emanating from an apartment,
established the grounds for a constitutional warrantless entry based on the
exigency rationale of evidence destruction); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 13 (1948) (recognizing that the presence of odors from burning opium may
justify issuance of a search warrant); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6
(1932) (“Prohibition officers may rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact
indicative of a possible crime.”).
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body. In comparison, the surface area of human olfactory
cells would cover no more than a postage stamp.”110
In the past, the government’s intrusion into one’s
privacy usually entailed some sort of physical trespass into
a protected Fourth Amendment space.111 Today, however,
110. Shannon R. Hurley-Deal, Note, State v. Fisher: Canine Sniffs—Who Let
The Dogs Out?, 26 N.C. CENT. L.J. 47, 51 (2003). Robert Bird also discusses the
source of the strength of dogs’ sense of smell:
The effect of the dog’s olfactory cells is not entirely clear. Some experts
claim the result is an enhanced ability to detect minute levels of
odorous material. Others assert that a canine’s strength lies in its
ability to discriminate among odors. Scientists supporting the
discrimination theory believe that each olfactory receptor responds to a
different odor; the more receptors, the greater the power to distinguish
between scents. The answer most likely lies somewhere between the
two opposing theories.
Bird, supra note 66, at 408-09. Additionally, on the topic of animal alternatives
to dogs, Bird notes the following:
Canines are not the only animal suitable for drug detection tasks. Some
law enforcement agencies have begun to use Vietnamese Potbellied
Pigs to detect narcotics. Sniffer pigs have been widely used by German
Police and Customs, and are beginning to gain acceptance in America. .
. . Further, their olfactory system is more sensitive than a dog’s, and
pigs are far more intelligent than their canine counterparts. . . . If the
trend continues, sniffer pigs may supplement or even replace dogs in
the narcotics detection task.
Id. at 411 n.41 (citations omitted). In “TED Talks, ” a scientist discusses how he
has successfully implemented two programs in Africa with rats that have been
trained to sniff out land mines and tuberculosis. Bart Weetjens: How I Taught
Rats
to
Sniff
Out
Land
Mines,
TED
(Dec.
2010),
http://www.ted.com/talks/bart_weetjens_how_i_taught_rats_to_sniff_out_land_
mines.html. Similar to dogs, domesticated rats have also been selectively bred
throughout the centuries for appearance, intelligence, and friendliness towards
humans. Id.
111. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (“Neither the
cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our
attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a
defendant, unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or
such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical
invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”). But see
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (“It is true that the absence
of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth
Amendment inquiry, for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches
and seizures of tangible property. But ‘[t]he premise that property interests
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.’
Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance
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technological advancements enhancing human sensory
capabilities make it possible to acquire information without
conducting such physical invasions. The first line of cases in
which the courts dealt with the issue of surveillance
technologies
concerned
low-level
sense
enhancing
technologies, such as searchlights112 and binoculars.113 The
courts have traditionally construed these simple
technologies as straightforward extensions of the human
senses and, therefore, as nonsearches that do not require a
warrant so long as the officer was lawfully present in the
place from which the evidence was seen, smelled, heard, or
touched—also defined as the “plain view” doctrine.114 The
idea was that because the police officer could perform the
task without physically invading a private space, the
investigation does not amount to a search.115 The question
without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside
the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on
which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth
Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well
to the recording of oral statements overheard without any ‘technical trespass
under local property law.’”) (citations omitted).
112. See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (finding “the use of a
searchlight [] comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass”).
113. See United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Christensen, 524 F. Supp. 344, 346-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“[Binoculars]
merely magnify what would in any event be apparent to the naked eye.”).
114. See Illinois v. Caballes, 548 U.S. 405, 416 n.6 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
115. This rationale was adopted in the case of beepers and was also used to
distinguish Global Positioning Devices (GPS) from beepers. See United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012) (distinguishing various Supreme Court
rulings related to beepers and GPS tracking). In United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 281 (1983), the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to the police use of beepers because a ‘‘person traveling in an automobile
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements.’’ But later, in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1984),
the Court explained that although the installation of a beeper was permissible,
monitoring it in a private residence violated the Fourth Amendment. More
recently, courts have struggled with the application of beeper jurisprudence to
GPS. For instance, the New York Court of Appeals stated:
GPS is not a mere enhancement of human sensory capacity, it
facilitates a new technological perception of the world in which the
situation of any object may be followed and exhaustively recorded over,
in most cases, a practically unlimited period. The potential for a similar
capture of information or “seeing” by law enforcement would require, at
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has become more complex, however, with the advent of
powerful new surveillance technologies.116
In its first consideration of such new surveillance
technologies, the Supreme Court in Kyllo held that when
police obtain by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could
not otherwise have been obtained without physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, this
constitutes a search, at least where the technology in
question is not in general public use.117
The question in the dog sniff cases is, then, whether a
sniff is a simple extension of the officer’s senses (similar to
eyeglasses), or whether it is an “advancing technology”
(similar to infrared sensors).118 When the dog is perceived as
a minimum, millions of additional police officers and cameras on every
street lamp.
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009).
116. See DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETY 53 (Univ. of Minneapolis Press 1994) (The “ten characteristics of the
new surveillance that set it apart from traditional forms of social control” are
that “[i]t transcends distance, darkness and physical barriers. It transcends
time, and this can be seen especially in the storage and retrieval capacity of
computers; personal information can be ‘freeze-dried.’. . . It is of low visibility or
invisible; data subjects are decreasingly aware of it. . . . It is frequently
involuntary. . . . Prevention is a major concern; think of bar-coded library books
or shopping mall video cameras, which are there to prevent loss, not to teach the
immorality, of theft. It is capital- rather than labour-intensive, which makes it
more and more economically attractive. It involves decentralized self-policing. . .
. It triggers a shift from identifying specific suspects to categorical suspicion. It
is both more intensive and more extensive. In Stanley Cohen’s metaphor, the
net is finer, more pliable, and wider.”) (footnotes omitted).
117. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see also Froh, supra note
59, at 342-43 (highlighting the four factors used by the Court to determine
whether police conduct amounts to a search: whether the “technique [is] senseenhancing,” whether “the intrusion [is] into an area traditionally associated
with personal privacy,” whether “the kind of device or technique in question is
generally available to the public,” and whether “the information obtained [is] of
a kind that could only have been acquired with physical trespassory invasion
into the area if not for the assistance of the device”) (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at
34).
118. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (“We have previously reserved judgment as to how
much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage
point, if any, is too much.”). For the definition of advancing technologies, see
supra note 10.
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an “old” rather than an “advancing” technology, the courts
tend to hold that the sniff is merely part of routine
investigation by the police and thus a nonsearch. 119 Indeed,
the courts have often taken different and, at times,
contradictory approaches when considering the status of
dogs as technologies. Moreover, some courts have avoided
this debate about whether dog sniffs are a traditional or
advancing technology by ruling that a dog is a dog, not
technology.120 The following two cases illustrate this complex
and contradictory identity of the police dog.
C. Is the Dog a Technology—and Where?
1. United States v. Thomas. In United States v.
Thomas,121 a magistrate issued a warrant based on an
affidavit submitted by a Drug Enforcement Administration
agent that argued for the existence of probable cause in part
based on a K-9 sniff outside of the defendant’s apartment.122
The defendant claimed that the canine sniff constituted an
illegal search, that without the illegal sniff there was no
probable cause to obtain a warrant in the first place, and
that, as a result, the evidence seized at his apartment
should have been suppressed.123 The Second Circuit court
agreed, holding that:
It is one thing to say that a sniff in an airport is not a search, but
quite another to say that a sniff can never be a search. The
question always to be asked is whether the use of a trained dog
intrudes on a legitimate expectation of privacy. While one
generally has an expectation of privacy in the contents of personal

119. See infra Part II.C; cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 n.6. The Court discusses
Ciraolo and responds to the dissent’s argument that protections dissipate when
technology enters general public use. Id. The majority declines to address the
problem of general public use technology, stating only that “we can quite
confidently say that thermal imaging is not routine.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
120. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Maryland, 864 A.2d 1006, 1015-16 (2004); see also
supra notes 11, 78-80 and accompanying text.
121. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
122. Id. at 1366.
123. Id.

110

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

luggage, this expectation is much diminished when the luggage is
124
in the custody of an air carrier at a public airport.

The court’s reasoning is instructive; it contended that
defining an investigation as a use of technology is not the
end of the exploration; one must also examine what was
investigated and where.125 Consequently, a practice that is
not intrusive in an airport may be intrusive when employed
at a person’s home.126 The court also looked into the degree
of sense enhancement when determining whether an
advanced technology was used. In the language of the court:
With a trained dog police may obtain information about what is
inside a dwelling that they could not derive from the use of their
own senses. Consequently, the officers’ use of a dog is not a mere
improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve
vision, but is a significant enhancement accomplished by a
127
different, and far superior, sensory instrument.

The fact that an ordinary policeman could not have
picked up such scents from outside the door of a private
residency thus led the court to conclude that the canine sniff
invaded the defendant’s expectation of privacy; because of
the defendant’s heightened expectation of privacy inside his
dwelling, the court concluded that the canine sniff
constituted a search.128 Since the agent had procured no
warrant, the search violated the Fourth Amendment.129
124. Id. at 1366 (citations omitted).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 1367 (emphasis added).
128. See id.; Hope Walker Hall, Comment, Sniffing Out the Fourth
Amendment: United States v. Place—Dog Sniffs—Ten Years Later, 46 ME. L.
REV. 151, 173-75 (1994); Barbara Tarlow, Note, Dog Sniff Searches and United
States v. Thomas: The Second Circuit Takes a Needed Bite Out of Place, 19 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (1986). In United States v. Waltzer, one judge praised
the dog’s reliability in detecting narcotics, calling the dog, “the able, canny
canine Kane, with the perfect record—all hits and no misses.” 682 F.2d 370, 374
(2d Cir. 1982) (Oakes, J., concurring). However, Kane later broke that perfect
record by erroneously alerting officers to narcotics in an apartment. See United
States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 756 (2d Cir. 1984).
129. See id. The New York Court of Appeals used a similar rationale in
considering a dog sniff an “investigative technique,” which constituted a search.
See New York v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1055, 1058 (N.Y. 1990). However, it
nevertheless found that there was reasonable suspicion of the presence of illegal
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2. Fitzgerald v. Maryland. The case of Fitzgerald v.
Maryland130 presents a strong contrast to Thomas on several
levels, especially regarding whether a dog should be defined
as a technology. In Fitzgerald, the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that “[a]s the canine sniff doctrine does not
depend upon the sniff’s location, we shall hold that a sniff of
an apartment door from a common area is a permissible
nonsearch under the Fourth Amendment.”131 The facts of
Fitzgerald are as follows: in February 2002, an anonymous
source informed the police that Fitzgerald and his girlfriend
sold marijuana.132 A subsequent investigation confirmed
that the couple lived in the building mentioned by the
informant.133 Furthermore:
[Officer] Brian then visited [Fitzgerald’s] apartment building
accompanied by Alex, [a] certified drug detection dog. Brian and
Alex entered the building through unlocked glass doors leading to
a vestibule with a stairwell and mailboxes. Brian led Alex to scan
apartment doors A, B, C, and D. Alex only “alerted” at apartment
A, indicating the presence of narcotics. . . . Alex repeated the sniffs
with identical outcomes. [Based on an affidavit that relied on the
result of Alex’s sniffs,] the next day the District Court judge
issued a search and seizure warrant for [Fitzgerald’s] apartment .
134
...

drugs in the residence to establish the constitutionality of the search. See id. at
1059. The court defined the canine sniff as a “supersensitive detection device,”
explaining that it exposed evidence that traveled beyond the perimeters of a
private space yet were not detectable to the police off-hand. Id. at 1058.
130. Fitzgerald v. Maryland, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).
131. Id. at 1007.
132. Id. at 1008.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Soon after, the warrant was executed.135 The police seized
“substantial amounts of marijuana and other evidence of
marijuana use and distribution.”136 Fitzgerald was arrested
and charged with possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute.137
The court distinguished between a dog sniff outside an
apartment and the use of a thermal imaging device, defined
as a search in Kyllo:
[I]t is clear that Kyllo has no bearing on dog sniffs. First, a dog is
not technology—he or she is a dog. A dog is known commonly as
‘man’s best friend.’ Across America, people consider dogs as
members of their family. The same cannot be said of cars,
138
blenders, or thermal imagers.

In a footnote, the court cited American Bar Association
standards that “proposed to prohibit the use of a
‘contraband-specific detection device’ on residences or
individuals.”139 A comment to section 2-9.2 of the standards
states that “a device which could mimic the behavior of
some specially trained dogs by alerting only to the presence
of drugs would be ‘contraband-specific.’”140 Based on this
text, the court reached the conclusion that “even pre-Kyllo,
the ABA recognized the difference between a drug detecting
dog and a ‘device’ or technology.”141 Further, the court noted
that although Justice Stevens’s dissent in Kyllo, joined by
Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy, criticized the term
“sense-enhancing technology” as overly broad, these
Justices also argued that this term should nonetheless
“embrace potential mechanical substitutes for dogs trained
to react when they sniff narcotics,”142 thereby implicitly
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1015.
139. Id. at 1015 n.8 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2-9.2 at 57 (3d ed. 1999)).
140. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ELEC. SURVEILLANCE § 2-9.2 cmt.
b (3d ed. 1999).
141. See Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1015 n.8.
142. Id. at 1015 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47 (2001) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added)).
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excluding dog sniffs. In another footnote, the court
addresses Fitzgerald’s argument that since an “inanimate
device performing the same function as Alex” is considered
a technology, so should Alex. In the words of the court:
We do not need to determine here whether employing a device
performing identical functions and with identical limitations to
live dogs would constitute a search. Faced with a device similar in
narrow scope to a dog, the Jacobsen Court held that its use did not
constitute a search. Faced with a thermal imager with a broader
scope, the Kyllo Court held that its use was a search. Either way,
Fitzgerald ignores that Kyllo’s holding and rationale centered on
“advancing technology.” A dog-mimicking device would be
technology that could advance to become far more invasive than a
143
dog’s sniff.

The court reasoned that unlike the dog, a technology
that imitates its powers would have the potential to develop
into something more invasive than any dog could ever be. In
other words, even when they perform the same function, the
two
detection
strategies—dog
and
machine—are
fundamentally different in light of the latter’s “creeping
potential.”144 The court held, accordingly, that dogs are not
an advanced technology. “Even taking into account
potential gains from evolution, breeding, and improved
nutrition, the limits to dogs’ future ability to smell are not
far from the current limits,” the court explained,145 quoting
from the lower court’s decision146 that stated:
We know that a canine “non-alert” may be as probative as an
“alert,” as, in Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes explained the
significance of “the dog that did not bark in the night.” In The
Odyssey, Homer recounts how Ulysses’s incognito return to
Ithaca, after an absence of twenty years, was almost compromised
143. Id. at 1015 n.9.
144. See supra notes 11, 26, 41. In Kyllo, Justice Scalia raised concern over the
creeping of advancing technologies, stating that a mechanical application of the
Fourth Amendment would “leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing
technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human activity
in the home.” 533 U.S. at 35-36; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that advancements in technology can
change people’s reasonable expectations and new technology may also provide
“increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy”).
145. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1016.
146. See id.
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when his faithful dog, Argos, alerted to the smell of his long
missing master. The point is that, solidly based in both fact and
fiction, the canine sense of smell is not a new or unfamiliar
147
“technology.”

The Maryland Court of Appeals held: “Not so with
technology. Technology is constantly advancing; few who
have witnessed the computer revolution doubt that
technology can advance in the future beyond our wildest
dreams today.”148
The court explained, further, that other Supreme Court
precedent imply that the Kyllo decision is inapplicable to
dog sniffs.149 The court explained that Kyllo was decided
with almost no mention of Place, which would not be the
case if it applied.150 “Were the Kyllo standard to apply to dog
sniffs, surely the Court would have discussed its wellestablished Place precedent.”151 The court also noted:
“Finally, Kyllo’s concern with the scope of thermal imagers
and potential revelation of intimate private details fits
neatly with Place’s rationale that dog sniffs are unique in
their narrow ‘yes/no’ [scope].”152 The court held, accordingly,
that “[a] person does not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in contraband, but does in bath water. A dog that

147. Id. at 1037-38.
148. Id. at 1016.
149. See id.
150. The Maryland court bolstered its argument by noting that less than seven
months before Kyllo, both the majority opinion and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
dissent in Edmond neatly and without much discussion stated the application of
Place to searches of automobiles and luggage. See id. at 1016. (discussing City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (citing United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983))); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52-53 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing Place, 492 U.S. at 706-07).
151. Fitzgerald, 837 A.2d at 1016. The court stated along these lines: “it is
clear that Kyllo has no bearing on dog sniffs.” Id. at 1015. This argument was
also advanced by Timothy Stone in his critique of Florida’s decision in State v.
Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), which applied the logic of Kyllo
to determine that the dog sniff of the defendant’s home was a warrantless
search. See Stone, supra note 62, at 1134-35.
152. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1016.
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can determine contraband’s existence and nothing else is
not a search, even when sniffing the exterior of a home.”153
D. The “Sui Generis” Nature of Dogs
The Maryland Court of Appeals is not alone in
emphasizing what it perceived to be important distinctions
between dogs and machines. Carolyn Snurkowski, Florida
Associate Deputy Attorney General, stated in her petition
for certiorari:
The Florida Supreme Court also overlooked the nature of the dog.
A dog is a dog, not the rapidly “advancing technology” that
concerned the Kyllo Court. . . . Chocolate Labrador Retrievers are
not “sophisticated systems.” Rather, they are common household
pets that possess a naturally strong sense of smell. Nor are dogs a
recent development. Rather, they have been part of human
communities for several millennia and were used at the time of
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in 1791. The Kyllo Court
characterized the thermal imagining device at issue as “a device
that is not in general public use.” Dogs, in stark contrast, are not

153. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Brock, the Seventh Circuit stated that
the Second Circuit’s holding in Thomas “has been rightly criticized” as
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent holding that a defendant’s
expectation of privacy must be one “that society is prepared to consider
reasonable.” 417 F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). In Brock, police were legally present inside an
apartment when a canine sniff alerted to the presence of narcotics behind a
locked bedroom door. Id. at 693-94. The police then obtained a search warrant
for the residence, listing the canine sniff as one of the elements leading to
probable cause. Id. The court held “that the dog sniff inside Brock’s residence
was not a Fourth Amendment search because it detected only the presence of
contraband and did not provide any information about lawful activity over
which Brock had a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Id. at 696. Along these
lines, in a case involving a dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior without any suspicion,
the Eight Circuit held that “when a police officer makes a traffic stop and has at
his immediate disposal the canine resources to employ this uniquely limited
investigative procedure, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment to require
that the offending motorist’s detention be momentarily extended for a canine
sniff of the vehicle’s exterior.” United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 101617 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
$404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir.1999)); see also United
States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 788 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[S]ubjecting the
exterior of such a motor vehicle to the olfactory genius of a drug detection dog
does not infringe upon the vehicle owner’s fourth amendment rights.”).
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a device and are quite common. Nor was there a “vigorous search
154
effort” at the front door; all Franky really did was breath[e].

Dogs, according to the Florida petition, are biological
entities, not technologies; they are also not sophisticated,
nor are they “new.” Based on this logic, dogs cannot be
defined as advancing technologies. All they really do is
breathe, something that only living organisms—not
machines—can do.
The argument about the distinct nature of dogs and
their sniffs was also implied in the founding Supreme Court
decision concerning dog sniffs, United States v. Place:
[T]he canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other
investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in
which the information is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude
that the particular course of investigation that the agents
intended to pursue here—exposure of respondent’s luggage, which
was located in a public place, to a trained canine—did not
constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
155
Amendment.

The Court’s sui generis label, I argue here, is applied to
the drug detection dog not only because of the limited
nature of its sniff, as the Court’s rationale overtly states,
but also because of the nature of the dog itself, as implied by
the Court. The Court, in other words, took a more lenient
approach toward a sniff performed by a biological organism
rather than by a mechanical device.
The Place logic was, however, lost on the Justices in
Jacobsen, as demonstrated by the catastrophic predictions
sketched out in this case by dissenting Justices Marshall
and Brennan:
[U]nder the Court’s analysis in these cases, law enforcement
officers could release a trained cocaine-sensitive dog— . . . a
“canine cocaine connoisseur”—to roam the streets at random,
alerting the officers to people carrying cocaine. Or, if a device were
developed that, when aimed at a person, would detect
instantaneously whether the person is carrying cocaine, there
would be no Fourth Amendment bar, under the Court’s approach,
154. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995
(2012) (No. 11-564).
155. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (1983).
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to the police setting up such a device on a street corner and
scanning all passersby. In fact, the Court’s analysis is so
unbounded that if a device were developed that could detect, from
the outside of a building, the presence of cocaine inside, there
would be no constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through
a residential neighborhood and using the device to identify all
homes in which the drug is present. In short, under the
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment first suggested in Place
and first applied in this case, these surveillance techniques would
not constitute searches and therefore could be freely pursued
whenever and wherever law enforcement officers desire. Hence, at
some point in the future, if the Court stands by the theory it has
adopted today, search warrants, probable cause, and even
“reasonable suspicion” may very well become notions of the
156
past.

Whereas all but one of these predictions involved the
use of machines, the first prediction—of dogs sniffing
persons on streets (and perhaps in their homes, too)—is
quite feasible. In fact, this prediction has already been
fulfilled, at least on the streets of New York City.157 The
reason for this reality, I claim here, is precisely that dogs
have been treated by the courts as sui generis and thus as
subject to less judicial scrutiny.158 Under my hypothesis,
what has been underlying the courts’ sui generis approach is
the perceived unconstructed, “first nature” of dogs,159 which
exists in stark contrast to manmade, nonorganic machines.
By this logic, the Supreme Court has mistakenly
distinguished dogs from technology, whereas it should have
granted similar protections from both.

156. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
157. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
majority of our sister circuits . . . have held that canine sniffs used only to detect
the presence of contraband are not Fourth Amendment searches.”).
159. “First nature” is defined as a primary, pristine, and abundant external
nature that remains untouched by human activity; in contrast, “second nature”
can be defined as forms of nature that have been transformed by human
activity. See NEIL SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: NATURE, CAPITAL, AND THE
PRODUCTION OF SPACE 19 (1984); see also Noel Castree, Socializing Theory:
Theory, Practice and Politics, in SOCIAL NATURE: THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLITICS
6-7 (Noel Castree & Bruce Braun eds., 2001); DAVID PEPPER, ECO-SOCIALISM:
FROM DEEP ECOLOGY TO SOCIAL JUSTICE 108 (1993).
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E. Guys, Binoculars, and “Smell-O-Matic” Machines
On October 31, 2012, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in the case of Florida v. Jardines.160 Although it
would be premature to predict how the Justices will decide
in this case, their questions and remarks during the
arguments—alongside those argued by the attorneys—
reveal the contested identity of the police dog. Specifically,
at least some of the Justices seem to subscribe to the
modernist dichotomy between nature and technology, which
I believe will subsequently inform their practical decision
about whether or not to define Franky’s sniff as a search.
Although at first glance the oral arguments seem to be
tackling numerous questions and going in myriad
directions, they can arguably be distilled into three distinct
approaches that revolve around the police dog’s status. On
one end of the spectrum is the approach that the dog is not
a technology; that for sniffing purposes, it is no different
than a “guy.”161 On the other end of the spectrum is the
approach that a dog is an advancing technology—a “smell-omatic” machine, similar to the infrared device used in
Kyllo.162 Somewhere between these two extremes is the
approach that configures the dog as a low-level technology,
akin to binoculars or telescopes.163 All three approaches rely,
to some degree or another, on the assumption challenged by
this Article: that nature and technology are clearly distinct
and independent categories. I will now proceed to explore
these three approaches in some detail.
The first approach was argued repeatedly in the oral
arguments by the petitioner and seemingly supported by
some of the Justices:
MR. GARRE: . . . Franky’s nose is not technology. It’s—he’s using—
he’s availing himself of God-given senses in the way that dogs
have helped mankind for centuries.
JUSTICE KAGAN: So does that mean that if we invented some kind
of little machine called a, you know, smell-o-matic and the
police officer had this smell-o-matic machine, and it alerted to
160. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 1.
161. Id. at 17, 19.
162. Id. at 16-17
163. Id. at 6.
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the exact same things that a dog alerts to . . ., the police officer
could not come to the front door and use that machine?
MR. GARRE: . . . . It would be different in that you don’t have
technology in this case. And I think that’s an important
distinction because, as we read Kyllo, the Court was very
concerned about advances in technology, and that’s just not true
for a dog’s nose.
JUSTICE KAGAN: So your basic distinction is the difference between
like a machine and Franky.
....
That we should not understand Franky as kind of a senseenhancing law enforcement technology, but we should think of
him as just like a guy.
MR. GARRE: Your Honor, I think that’s true for two reasons. One is
Franky is using the same sense of smell that dogs have used for
centuries. So this isn’t a case where if you allow a dog to sniff
today, he might use x-ray vision in the future.
And the other thing is that Franky—that the use of dogs for
their sense of smell, which everyone agrees is extraordinary,
164
mankind has been using them for centuries.

Under the first approach, then, the use of dogs by the
police is no different from their use by a friendly neighbor.165
And just as the police should not be expected to shield their
eyes from what is in plain view, they should also not be
expected to shield their nose from sniffing what is in plain
smell.166 The dog is portrayed here as a natural extension of
the human police officer—as a “guy,” in Justices Kagan’s
and Sotomayor’s succinct phrase.167 The petitioner
highlights this interchangeability between dog and officer
when arguing that, “there is no invasion in their . . .
expectation of privacy when either a man or a dog, when
lawfully present on the property, uses their God-given

164. Id. at 16-18.
165. Id. at 41.
166. Id. at 45; see Susan F. Mandiberg, Marijuana Prohibition and the
Shrinking of the Fourth Amendment, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 23, 39-43 (2012)
(noting cases about plain smell).
167. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 17, 19.
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senses to detect [drugs].”168 This argument assumes that the
dog’s nose as a God-given sense—as natural and ahistorical,
as opposed to artificial or manmade—cannot logically
coexist with the dog’s definition as a technology. Justice
Alito seemed to be in agreement with this construction of
the dog when he questioned the respondent:
I thought the relevance of technology was that the technology that
we have now . . . much of it was not available at the time when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted, so we can’t tell what . . . people
in 1791 would have thought about it.
But that’s not true of dogs. Dogs were around. They have been
around for 10,000 years . . . and they’ve been used to detect scents
for 10,000—for thousands of years. Certainly, they were available
169
for that purpose in 1791, weren’t they?

On the opposite end of the spectrum is the approach
articulated by the respondent. According to this approach,
K-9s are advancing technologies and, as such, their sniffs of
protected spaces should be defined as searches that require
probable cause, even when performed from the sidewalk.
This approach is evident from the following excerpt from the
oral arguments:
JUSTICE KAGAN: . . .[Y]ou do concede if the police officer walks up
to the door, smells it himself, no problem there; is that right?
....

168. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). In Florida v. Harris, Florida argued similarly,
albeit in a different context, that: “Dogs, like humans, become old and impaired
over time.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 1796
(2012) (No. 11-817) [hereinafter “Transcript of Oral Argument, Harris”].
169. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 47. The Court
elicited that there is an apparent paucity of cases on point:
JUSTICE ALITO: If a dog on a leash is brought up to the front door of a
person’s house, was that a trespass at the time when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted?
MR. BLUMBERG: If it was without the consent of the homeowner, yes, it
was a trespass.
JUSTICE ALITO: What is the case that says that?
MR. BLUMBERG: I do not have a case.
Id. at 38.
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So the difference is the dog. So what difference does the dog
make?
....
And, you know, to make it even more, the dog is not a scarylooking dog, the dog is a Cockapoo.
So just like, you know, your neighbor with his Cockapoo walks up
to your door all the time, that’s what this police officer has done.
Why do you win that?
MR. BLUMBERG: Well, whether it’s a Cockapoo or Franky, who,
from all the pictures, appears to be a very cute dog, it’s not what
the dog looks like, it’s what the dog is doing on the front porch,
which is—
JUSTICE KAGAN: The dog does what your neighbor’s dog does.
MR. BLUMBERG: Well, no, this dog—the neighbor’s dog does not
search for evidence on your front porch. That’s the key
170
distinction.

Justice Ginsburg summarized the second approach later in
the arguments when she reflected back at the respondent: “I
thought you were talking about a dog trained to detect
contraband . . . not just any old dog.”171
Finally, the third, middle ground, approach—
articulated most explicitly by Justice Scalia—seems to be
the least contingent on the status of the dog, and the most
contingent upon the particular location of the sniff. This
approach treats the sniff as analogous to simple senseenhancing devices such as binoculars. Accordingly, if the
dog sniff is used from a legitimate standpoint—a public
170. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 40-41. The oral
arguments mentioned the use of dogs as advanced technology:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . . If the police go by with their dog
intending to sniff, and the dog alerts, on the sidewalk but two feet
away is the front door, that’s okay, right?
....
MR. BLUMBERG: No, it’s not okay, respectfully, because the dog would
still be revealing details inside the home that the officer could not
reveal using his or her ordinary senses.
Id. at 45; see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2001).
171. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 55.
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street, for example—the sniff does not invade reasonable
expectations of privacy. However, when performed at the
curtilage of the home, the dog sniff transforms into a search.
In Justice Scalia’s words:
And there’s such a thing as what is called the curtilage of a house.
As I understand the law, the police are entitled to use binoculars
to look into the house if—if the residents leave the blinds open,
right?
....
But if they can’t see clearly enough from a distance, they’re not
entitled to go onto the curtilage of the house, inside the gate, and
use the binoculars from that vantage point, are they?
....
[So] why isn’t it the same thing with the dog? This dog was
172
brought right up—right up to the—to the door of the house.

In another hypothetical, Justice Scalia replaced the
binoculars with a different low-level technology: the
telescope. He suggested:
Suppose you—you have someone who, who has been guilty of a
crime. He has—he has the body. He has committed a murder and
he has the body in the home. He certainly wants to keep that
private, right? And he foolishly and mistakenly leaves the blinds
open in the room where—where the corpse is lying, and the
policeman at a great distance has a telescope and he looks
through the blinds and he sees the corpse. Can the police go into
173
the home?

Finally, Justice Scalia clarified: “It isn’t just the sniffing in
the abstract. It’s the sniffing at this point, the sniffing at a
person’s front door.”174 Justice Scalia explained that he

172. Id. at 6.
173. Id. at 33.
174. Id. at 15. Justice Breyer approaches the problem similarly:
I’ve been trying to figure out just what you say, but in a slightly
different form. Do people come up to the door with dogs? Yes. Do the
dogs breathe? Yes.
Do in fact policemen, like other people, come up and breathe? Yes. Do
we expect it? Yes, we expect people to come up and breathe. But do we
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treats the police dog’s sniff no differently than he would
treat any other sniff—even by a human police officer—when
performed on the curtilage of a home for the purpose of conducting a search.175
Although Scalia’s approach ostensibly moves away from
the status of the dog to the status of place and property, it is
nonetheless contingent on the assumption that the dog is
akin to binoculars, not to infrared machines. All of this is
for a reason: in Kyllo, Scalia wrote the majority opinion that
found the use of advancing technology as constituting a
search, even when conducted from “open fields.”176 Here,
however, Scalia clearly posited that a K-9 sniff may be performed from the sidewalk, similar to the use of binoculars.
It is the dog sniff’s status as a simple sense-enhancing technology—somewhere between a “guy” and a “smell-o-matic”
machine—that then translates, in Scalia’s statements, into
a legal geography of sniffs.177
F. Reliability
As a result of the growing concerns with the accuracy of
dog alerts, when ruling on the constitutionality of sniffs,
lower courts (but not the Supreme Court178) are increasingly
expect them to do what happened here? And at that point, I get into the
question: What happened here?
Id. at 56-57.
175. Id. at 44.
176. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001). “Open fields” fall
outside of Fourth Amendment protection because they cannot be construed as
persons, houses, papers, or effects within the constitutional meaning. See Hester
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (holding that “the special protection
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses,
papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields,” and establishing the
doctrine used today for searches and seizures). Later, the Court reapplied the
“open fields” doctrine to reiterate its continued authority in a case involving “no
trespassing” signs. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984)
(“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or
surveillance.”).
177. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 6-7.
178. Robert Bird emphasizes that the Supreme Court has never questioned an
accuracy record of a particular canine, nor has it addressed the specific
qualifications for a particular canine; he suggests, as a result, that “lower courts
have attempted to fill the gap and determine when a canine alert may be
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considering the circumstances of dog sniffs in establishing
their reliability. Although these decisions are usually not
framed through the bifurcated conception of dogs and
machines revealed in this Article, they nonetheless point to
the growing recognition that detection dogs are similar to
advancing technologies, especially in demonstrating their
reliability.
Specifically, in Oregon v. Foster179 and Oregon v.
Helzer,180 Oregon’s Supreme Court recently held that only
an alert by “a properly trained and reliable drug-detection
dog [could] be a basis for probable cause to search.”181 The
court explained that this inquiry should be based on the
totality of the circumstances, including the dog’s training,
certification, and performance—on the one hand, and the
handler’s training, certification, and performance when
teaming with the dog—on the other hand.182
accepted as reliable.” See Bird, supra note 66, at 417. But see United States v.
Dillon, 810 F. Supp. 57, 61 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]he canine sniffing technique ‘is
now sufficiently well-established to make a formal recitation of a police dog’s
curriculum vitae unnecessary in the context of ordinary warrant applications . .
. .’”) (quoting United States v. Watson, 551 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D.D.C. 1982)).
179. 252 P.3d 292 (Or. 2011). In Foster, the defendant was pulled over for a
traffic violation. Id. at 294. The officer called for a canine unit based on his
previous observation of the defendant and the belief that he had just conducted
criminal activity. Id. The detection dog sniffed the exterior of the vehicle and
alerted at the driver’s side door. Id. The defendant refused to consent to a search
of the vehicle, but the officers proceeded and found methamphetamine residue
on a pipe inside a fanny pack on the seat of the car. Id.
180. 252 P.3d 288 (Or. 2011).
181. See Foster, 252 P.3d at 294. In Helzer, the Oregon Supreme Court applied
the totality of the circumstances test set forth in Foster, and concluded that the
government failed to provide evidence of what factors went into the
handler/canine training and failed to provide details of the canines’ previous
training. 252 P.3d at 289. Consequently, the court held that the government did
not meet its burden and that the evidence should therefore be suppressed. Id. at
291-92.
182. Foster, 252 P.3d at 298. Furthermore, Foster argued that dogs trained to
detect odors were unreliable since they may lead to an alert based on residual
odors versus actual drugs. Id. at 298. He also contended that the “play-reward”
method used to train detection dogs is unreliable because it is not widely
accepted among the scientific community. Id. at 302. The court rejected both
arguments on the premise that “[p]robable cause does not require the use of the
most reliable source of information, rather than a sufficiently reliable source;
neither do standards for the admissibility of evidence at trial apply to the
assessment of probable cause.” Id. The “play-reward” method is used by police to
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The Supreme Court is currently considering Florida v.
Harris, which focuses on the question of canine reliability.183
This case concerns an exterior canine sniff of a vehicle.184
Although the Florida court could have easily decided the
case in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Place and
Caballes, it held instead that sufficient probable cause only
exists when there is a reasonable basis for believing that
the specific canine is reliable based on the totality of the
circumstances.185 Furthermore, the court found “that
evidence that the dog had been trained and certified to
detect narcotics, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish
the dog’s reliability for purposes of determining probable
cause.”186 The burden of establishing the dog’s reliability
rests upon the prosecution, which must present evidence
relating to: “the dog’s training and certification records, an
explanation of the meaning of the particular training and
certification,”187 field performance and records of the
canine’s alerts, the field officer’s training and handling of
the dog, and “any other evidence known to the officer about
the dog’s reliability.”188
In the oral arguments in Florida v. Harris, Florida
argued that the Supreme Court should prescribe a narrow
test for determining a K-9’s reliability:
train detection dogs throughout the United States. See id. at 295. It involves
pairing and training canine-handler teams in the following manner: the handler
takes a play toy, such as a tennis ball, and submerges it in a drug (heroin,
cocaine, meth, or marijuana); the dog is familiarized with the odor by playing
with the tennis ball; the trainer then hides the tennis ball and the dog must find
it through sniffing its odor; after this, the handler hides a drug rather than the
submerged ball and the dog sniffs out the drug; as a reward, the dog is
permitted to play with his or her favorite toy. Id.
183. 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012) (No. 11-817). The oral arguments in Harris followed
immediately after those in Jardines, on October 31, 2012. As I argue in this
Part, in many ways these two cases are quite interrelated.
184. See Harris v. Florida, 71 So. 3d 756, 760, 762 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012).
185. In the language of the court: “Because a dog cannot be cross-examined
like a police officer,” it is the state’s burden to show “that the officer had a
reasonable basis for believing the dog to be reliable” before conducting the
search. Id. at 758, 759.
186. Id. at 759.
187. Id. at 775.
188. Id.
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MR. GARRE: Well, Your Honor, in our view, we don’t think it’s – it’s
an appropriate role for the Court to delve into the contours of
the training, what specific methods were used to train or
distract or—you know, all the contours that [the respondents]
bring up in their brief.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what does a judge do, just say, the police
department says this is adequate, so I have to accept it’s
adequate.
MR. GARRE: [Y]ou would have to accept it, Your Honor, on its
189
face.

This approach seems to have won strong support from
some of the Justices. Here, for example, is an excerpt from
the exchange between Justice Scalia and the respondent:
JUSTICE SCALIA: What—what—what are the—what are the
incentives here? Why would a police department want to use an
incompetent dog? Is that any more likely than that a medical
school would want to certify an incompetent doctor? What—
what incentive is there for a police department?
MR. GIFFORD: The incentive is to acquire probable cause to search
when it wouldn’t otherwise—otherwise be available. . . .
JUSTICE SCALIA: Willy-nilly. . . . So let’s get dogs that, you know,
smell drugs when there are no drugs. You really think that
that’s what’s going on here?

189. Transcript of Oral Argument, Harris, supra note 168, at 8. Palmore,
supporting the petitioner, explains:
I think it’s critical, as Mr. Garre pointed out, that the courts not
constitutionalize dog training methodologies or hold mini trials with
expert witnesses on what makes for a successful dog training program.
Because, as Mr. Garre said, the Government has critical interests, life
and death interests, that it stakes on the reliability of these dogs.
So the U.S. Marshals use dogs to protect Federal judges. The Federal
Protective Services use dogs to keep bombs out of Federal buildings.
The TSA uses dogs to keep bombs off of airplanes. FEMA uses dogs to
find survivors after hurricanes.
There are 32 K-9 teams in the field right now in New York and New
Jersey looking for survivors of Hurricane Sandy.
So, in situation after situation, the government has in a sense put its
money where its mouth is, and it believes at an institutional level that
these dogs are quite reliable.
Id. at 26.
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MR. GIFFORD: Officers like to search so that they can get probable
cause so that they can advance their career. Forfeiture is also
an issue.
JUSTICE SCALIA: They like to search where they’re likely to find
something, and that only exists when the dog is well trained. It
190
seems to me they have every incentive to train the dog well.

The first half of this Article provided an extensive
review of the Supreme Court’s still implicit and the lower
courts’ explicit assumptions about the nature-culture
schism and its centrality in the context of drug detection
dogs. In the remainder of this Article, I will draw on the
sociology of science literature to offer an alternative
conceptual framework for evaluating the K-9 in the context
of Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.
III. BIOTECHNOLOGY
A. Technology and Biology
Courts’ distinction between dogs and technologies is
grounded in common assumptions that juxtapose nature
and humanly constructed artifacts—or nature and
culture.191 Such assumptions, I claim in this Article, are
incorrect, unsustainable, and can have devastating effects
when applied in the legal arena—namely the removal of
constitutional protections from an invasive investigation
merely because the dog is deemed “nature” rather than
“machine.” Two interrelated assumptions underlie the
nature/technology binary construed by the courts. First is
the assumption that only humanly constructed things can
be classified as technology; because humans do not
manufacture dogs, the latter cannot be defined as a
technology. The second assumption is that the distinction
between dogs and machines rests on the deeper and more
fundamental distinction between organic and dead matter.
190. Id. at 34-35.
191. Many scholars have written critically about the nature-culture divide.
See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, POLITICS OF NATURE: HOW TO BRING THE SCIENCES INTO
DEMOCRACY 49 (2004); KATE SOPER, WHAT IS NATURE: CULTURE, POLITICS AND
THE NON-HUMAN 8-9 (1995); RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY 79
(1975). For a summary of such critiques, see IRUS BRAVERMAN, ZOOLAND: THE
INSTITUTION OF CAPTIVITY 29-50 (2012).
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The following Parts address both assumptions and present
my argument that K-9 sniffs should be understood by courts
as an advancing technology and scrutinized as such. In a
significant departure from the dominant “either/or”
approach articulated earlier, I will draw on science and
technology studies (STS) scholarship to demonstrate that
human relationships with seemingly natural animals are
actually much more complex and reflective of human agency
than one might think from reading judicial opinions. In line
with this approach is my argument that police dogs are
“biotechnologies.”
The remainder of this Article can be distilled into two
arguments. First is my argument that today’s drug-sniffing
dogs are very much “manufactured”: dogs are selectively
bred for war and law enforcement, they are used for medical
research, and, finally, they increasingly operate alongside
nonorganic technologies (video cameras, for example) to
perform highly specialized functions. Given this
specialization, the law enforcement dog sniff is unlikely to
be in “general public use.” Second is my argument that
despite the dog’s actual function as a technology, it is also
very much alive and organic. These properties of the dog
may serve to explain why courts have treated it (or her/him)
very much as a living, almost human, entity—and as the
opposite of “dead” technology. Accordingly, I will show how
police treat K-9s as family members, how special rights are
given to police dogs akin to rights for human officers, and
how these dogs are deemed mystically infallible in their
detection skills. The term “biotechnology” holds together
these two coexisting dimensions of the police dog.
B. Biotechnology in STS Scholarship
Biotechnology is commonly defined as an industry of
applied biology that involves the use of living organisms and
bioprocesses in engineering, medicine, and other fields.192
Here, however, I would like to adopt the somewhat different
and more specific STS definition of biotechnology as
“biological artifacts shaped by humans to serve human

205. Biotechnology Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
http://www.oed.com./view/Entry/19255 (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
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ends”193 and as a “coproduction of natures and cultures and
the interpenetration of bodies and technologies.”194 The term
“coproduction” is key here.195 This term’s use by STS
scholars indicates a move from technological determinism
and social constructivism to a more systemic understanding
of how technology and society coproduce each other—
namely, how two or more variables in a system affect, and
essentially create, each other.196 Another key component in
the above definition of biotechnology is the interplay
between natures and cultures, what Donna Haraway refers
to as “naturecultures.”197
Edmund Russell explores the ways in which humans
have shaped evolution through changing both themselves
and other species.198 In his book The Garden in the Machine:
Toward an Evolutionary History of Technology, Russell
inverts Leo Marx’s argument in his book, The Machine in
the Garden, which exemplifies how technology has been
perceived as an intrusion, especially in nineteenth century
American literature.199 Russell frames the history of modern
193. Edmund Russell, Introduction: The Garden in the Machine: Toward an
Evolutionary History of Technology, in INDUSTRIALIZING ORGANISMS:
INTRODUCING EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY 1 (Susan R. Schrepfer & Philip Scranton
eds., 2004).
194. DONNA HARAWAY, WHEN SPECIES MEET 56 (2008) [hereinafter HARAWAY
2008].
195. See id.
196. Jasanoff, supra note 14, at 2-3; see also Harbers, supra note 14, at 11.
197. According to Donna Haraway, “naturecultures” refers to the failure of the
boundaries between nature and culture and the way culture is always already
implicated in any conception of nature, rendering the nature/culture binary
irrelevant and incorrect. See HARAWAY 2008, supra note 194, at 6, 11.
“Naturecultures” does not necessarily mean that “nature” does not exist, but
that it has never existed apart from culture. See id. By referring to this term in
the plural, Haraway indicates that “naturecultures” are the spaces where these
boundaries are transgressed, while at the same time calling attention to the
demand for specificity. See id. Hence, “natureculture” is not a monolithic
structure, but rather one instance of a plurality of “naturecultures.” See id.; id.
at 56; DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN 8 (1991).
198. See Russell, supra note 193, at 1.
199. See id.; LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
PASTORAL IDEAL IN AMERICA 343 (35th Anniversary ed., 2000). Marx’s analysis
focuses on the contrasting images of industry and nature in nineteenth century
American literature. Id. at 3-4. He argues that cultural concerns over the
decline of wilderness have led to the proliferation of the idea of what he calls
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understandings of technology as growing from the
assumptions that technology is entirely separate from
nature:
[T]echnology replaced or modified nature, but nature was not
technology. But since machines are always made from metal,
wood, rubber, and other products of nature, the assumption boils
down to—put bluntly—nature having to be dead to be
200
technology.

This view of the separation of nature and technology is
incorrect, he argues, because “cattle, sheep, and horses did
not simply witness the intrusion of technology into nature. .
. . [T]hey were biological artifacts shaped by humans to
serve human ends. They were technology and, in the root
meaning of the word, biotechnology.”201
Haraway
applies
Russell’s
understanding
of
biotechnology to dogs, suggesting that “dogs deliberately
selected and enhanced for their working capacities, for
example, as herders, are biotechnologies in a system of
market farming that became contemporary capital-intensive
agribusiness through a welter of nonlinear processes and
assemblages.”202 Although Haraway admits that Russell’s
analysis attributes near-absolute agency to humans, she
nonetheless finds this framework “rich for thinking about
valuing dogs as biotechnologies, workers, and agents of
technoscientific knowledge production in the regime of
lively capital.”203 Haraway then applies this framework to
experimental dogs, dogs as patients, and dogs trained by
prisoners in rehabilitation projects.204
Still in the realm of dogs, another STS scholar describes
“how dogs with inherited bleeding disorders were brought
into laboratory settings in the United States . . . [and] the
value of understanding what historians of biology and
“the machine in the garden,” or technology as intrusion into a pristine yet
vanishing nature (the “pastoral ideal”). Id.; see id. at 265. This intrusion by the
machine not only threatened to disturb American wilderness itself, but also
disrupted important cultural views of life and pastoral ideals. Id. at 6-7.
200. Russell, supra note 193, at 1.
201. Id.
202. HARAWAY 2008, supra note 194, at 56.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 56-57.
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biomedical science mean when they claim that laboratory
organisms are products of scientific and social practice.”205
Through these laboratory experiments, “a new kind of
organism came into being.”206 The experiments performed on
these dogs had direct effects on developments in medical
research, suggesting that laboratory dogs were a cultivated
technology, organisms that “are both born and made” and,
as such, demanded a moral response of care from human
scientists.207
Dogs are not the only animals that exist in the uneasy
space between living creatures and mechanized technology;
it is equally important to note how other working animals
entered the popular perception of biotechnologies. Ann
Greene applies the notion of biotechnology to war horses as
she tracks the history of the Union’s procurement and use of
horses during the American Civil War.208 Greene argues
that the current distinction between technology and horses
is entirely contrary to nineteenth century conceptions of the
horse’s place within industrialization.209 The American Civil
War, Greene argues, was as much “the first industrialized
war” as it was “a war of extensive animal power.”210 The
transportation of soldiers and supplies over land required
significant animal work.211 Aside from wagon horses used for
transportation, artillery horses to pull field guns, and
horses used for cavalry mounts, horses were also crucial to
the functioning of armies in the Civil War.212 In fact, “the
Union army alone employed between 650,000 and 1,000,000
horses.”213 Horses were not only “components of war
technology,” they were also seen as such by their Civil War
205. Stephen Pemberton, Canine Technologies, Model Patients: The Historical
Production of Hemophiliac Dogs in American Biomedicine, in INDUSTRIALIZING
ORGANISMS, supra note 193, at 191, 191-92.
206. Id. at 194.
207. Id. at 203-05.
208. See Ann N. Greene, War Horses: Equine Technology in the American Civil
War, in INDUSTRIALIZING ORGANISMS, supra note 193, at 143, 143-65.
209. See id. at 159-61.
210. Id. at 143 (quotation marks omitted).
211. See id. at 146.
212. Id. at 147.
213. Id. at 143.
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contemporaries, who “frequently employed mechanical
metaphors to describe and understand horses as prime
movers.”214 “Army horses were the central component in a
network of relationships,” Greene writes.215 For a very long
time, horses have been considered “military instruments”
and “[i]n the Civil War, as in the present, horses proved to
be integral components of the most modern technological
systems.”216
Another historical study about work animals shows that
people living in cities viewed horses along the same lines as
mechanical trolleys.217 Beginning with the development of
the concept of “horsepower” in 1775, horses were
increasingly viewed as property and their work was
mechanized as such.218 With the invention of the steam
engine, consumers could “know how many horses an engine
would replace in order to judge its economic value.”219
Developments in thermodynamics and the invention of the
dynamometer also increased the prevalence of animalmachine comparisons.220 The nineteenth century saw
important changes in the styles of transportation—public,
private, and freight—within cities, from one-horse carts to
teams, and the horse-drawn omnibus and horse car. 221 The
omnibus was pulled by four horses and operated on “fixed
schedules and predetermined routes.”222 Finally, “[w]hen
owners perceived horses as obsolescent and unable to
compete first with electric street cars and then with the new
motor trucks and motor cars, they disappeared with
astonishing rapidity except for some specialized niche
214. Id. at 159-60.
215. Id. at 160.
216. Id. at 161; see also Barbara Orland, Turbo-Cows: Producing a Competitive
Animal in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, in INDUSTRIALIZING
ORGANISMS, supra note 193, at 167, 167 (examining the development of highyield dairy cows in nineteenth century Europe as a fruitful context for studying
human-animal coproduction in a nonwar context).
217. Joel A. Tarr & Clay McShane, The Horse as an Urban Technology, 15 J.
URB. TECH., 1, 5, 14-15 (2008).
218. Id. at 7.
219. Id. at 8.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 10, 14-15.
222. Id. at 10.
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areas.”223 The study points to this disappearance as the final
proof of the interchangeability between horses and
machines in the urban environment.224
In what follows, I will demonstrate that similar to war
and urban horses and hemophilic dogs, the history of police
detection dogs is rife with rich applications of the
biotechnology framework. The following Parts will explore
how detection dogs and humans have altered each other in
the course of their shared history and, more recently, in
canine breeding and human-dog training for law
enforcement duties. I propose that a legal test that
disregards the imbricated nature of dog-human
naturecultures is not only flawed conceptually and
experientially, but is also bound to crash into the cyborg
realities of contemporary and future surveillance schemes.
IV. WAR AND DETECTION DOGS: A CO-EVOLUTION
This Part provides a brief historical and cultural
account of the use of dogs for human ends, thereby
demonstrating a few interrelated points: 1) that work dogs
are historical and cultural entities infused with human
meaning; 2) that although work dogs have been around for
many centuries, the use of dogs as detection or surveillance
devices has only surged in the past several decades; 3) that
the military dog is the forefather of contemporary police
dogs; 4) that the multiple detection functions of dogs have
resulted in their genotypic and phenotypic differentiation
into numerous subspecies; and 5) that professional
studbooks and pedigrees are increasingly used to make
breeding decisions that produce the “best” surveillance dog.
Through their recruitment as soldiers in human wars and
as family members in our homes, dogs have multiplied in
unprecedented numbers.225
A. Dogs in the Service of Human Wars
The United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA)
National Detector Dog Manual describes the history of dog
223. Id. at 15.
224. Id. at 14-15.
225. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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work in human service in great detail.226 According to the
manual, this history goes back thousands of years and is
centrally bound up in warfare.227 Similar to horses, dogs
were used in a multitude of roles ranging from guards to
messengers, and were also used as mascots and draft
animals:
[War dogs serviced] the Egyptians, Greeks, Assyrians, Persians,
and the Roman Empire. Roman legions deployed entire
formations of armored attack dogs against enemy armies. Attila
the Hun used mastiff-type dogs and Talbot hounds . . . as warriors
in his campaigns and as sentries when his troops were
228
encamped.

Although humans have used dogs in the service of war
for centuries, it was only in the last several decades that the
potential usefulness of dogs’ scenting ability was recognized
in the service of war and law enforcement.229 The USDA
National Detector Dog Manual suggests that “[p]erhaps the
most famous early scenting dog was Barry, a Saint
Bernard,” who lived in Switzerland in the early nineteenth
century, but that dogs had been used for their ability to find
people by smell in the United States Army for at least half a
century before that.230 The manual explains that “Benjamin
Franklin recommended the use of dogs by the U.S. Army as
a means of searching for marauders who were killing
colonists and burning settlements near Boston. . . . In 1835,
the U.S. Army imported bloodhounds from Cuba . . . to use
as mantrackers.”231
These efforts, however, do not necessarily qualify as
organized. The first organized effort took place in Nazi
Germany, where the army “used tracker dogs to silently
follow [the] tracks of the British Special Air Services (SAS)
officers who parachuted into Germany to collect intelligence
226. U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATIONAL DETECTOR DOG MANUAL, app. C at C-1-1
(2004),
available
at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/plants/manuals/ports/downloads/
detector_dog.pdf [hereinafter USDA Manual].
227. See id.
228. Id.
229. See id at C-1-1 to C-1-2.
230. Id.
231. Id. at C-1-2.
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prior to WWII.”232 These dogs were both trackers and attack
dogs and were so effective that the British Army quickly
adopted this method, developing the “Recce Patrols” that
used “human scouts and tracker dogs to locate the Japanese
who were hiding on islands in the Pacific theatre.”233
B. Dogs in the Service of the War on Drugs
In the United Kingdom, law enforcement began training
dogs to detect illegal substances as early as the 1950s.234 But
it was not until 1968 that the United States Department of
Defense launched an official Military Working Dog Program
in San Antonio, Texas, at Lackland Air Force Base.235
Concurrently, the United States Customs Service initiated
“an experimental narcotic detector dog training program,”
after carefully studying the capabilities of dogs to detect
illegal substances.236 This program focused on “training dogs
to detect and respond to marijuana and hashish,” but
quickly “expanded the targeted drugs to include cocaine and
heroin.”237 Also of note is the fact “the Customs dogs gave
the first example of versatility of dogs in learning to
discriminate several target odors.”238 Prior to the training of
these dogs, it was thought unlikely that a dog could learn to
distinguish between four distinct odors.239 Around the same
time, in response to the growing troubles in Northern
Ireland, the British Royal Army Veterinary Corps began
training its dogs in explosives detection work.240 In 1973, the
United States added explosives detection to their dog
training programs.241
By this point, most governments had incorporated
detector dogs into their armies and law enforcement
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. USDA Manual, supra note 226, at C-1-2.
235. Id.
236. See id. at C-1-3.
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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agencies.242 The current use of these dogs in law
enforcement and elsewhere covers a range of diverse
functions and interests that reflect the dog’s flexibility. As
stated in the USDA National Detector Dog Manual:
[T]hey assist local, state and federal agencies in locating evidence,
intercepting contraband and smuggled items, help police officers
find criminals, lost children and the bodies of victims, are
members of search-and-rescue teams, seek out land mines, search
for live victims of earthquakes and other disasters, find evidence
in arson investigations, detect explosive devices, poached abalone,
243
and can even detect malignant skin growths.

Some criminal procedure scholars believe that “[d]uring
the past twenty years, the United States has been fighting
one of the most difficult wars in its history: the war on
drugs. The narcotics detection dog has been a stalwart ally
in that conflict, detecting illegal narcotics on countless
occasions.”244 In the context of the war on drugs:
[S]tate and federal officials use drug detection dogs during
[routine] investigations. For example, in Texas, the Department of
Public Safety deploys more than twenty dog-handler teams,
[which] routinely perform more than 1000 sniff tests annually.
Arizona’s Department of Public Safety likewise deploys more than
25 canine teams. And in 2010, the Virginia State Police
Department’s 18 narcotic teams led to 118 arrests and 127 drug
245
seizures.

The emergence of detection dogs in American policing is
reflected in the elevated legal status of these dogs within
the police force. “In many jurisdictions, the intentional
injuring or killing of a police dog is defined as a felony,
subjecting the perpetrator to harsher penalties than animal
cruelty laws.”246 Additionally, “[s]ome law-enforcement
242. See, e.g., id. (discussing Mexico’s use of dogs in agricultural detection).
243. Id. at C-1-6.
244. See Bird, supra note 66, at 405.
245. Brief for Texas et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioner, supra note
25, at 2-3 (citations omitted).
246. Police Dog, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_dog (last
visited Nov. 27, 2012). For a comprehensive list of state statutes from
California, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Texas
(pending legislation), and Utah, see Statutes Protecting Police Dogs, EDEN
CONSULTING GROUP, http://www.policek9.com/html/statutes.html (last visited
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organizations outfit dogs with ballistic vests and some make
the dogs sworn officers, [supplying] them with . . . police
badges and IDs.”247 In certain cases, “the police chief
administers the human oath of office to the dog, and the
handler affirms on the dog’s behalf.”248 In other cases, “the
dog is trained to bark in affirmation of the oath.”249 Finally,
“[w]hen the ceremony is complete, the dog is presented with
a badge to wear on its collar.”250 Furthermore, anyone who
kills a federal law enforcement animal faces fines and up to
ten years in prison.251 Similar laws protect K-9s from
malicious injury in every state except South Dakota,252 and
various statutes apply to “every canine cop.”253 Finally, “a
police dog killed in the line of duty [may be] given a full
police funeral.”254
This historical review of the use of detection dogs for
human ends makes abundantly clear that “[h]uman life
ways changed significantly in association with dogs.
Flexibility and opportunism are the name of the game for
both species, who shape each other throughout the still
May 31, 2012); see also Animal Cruelty Laws State by State, STRAY PET
ADVOCACY
(2003),
http://www.straypetadvocacy.org/PDF/AnimalCrueltyLaws.pdf.
247. Police Dog, supra note 246; see, e.g., VEST ‘N P.D.P.,
http://vestnpdp.com/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (explaining that it is
a non-profit organization dedicated to providing bulletproof and stabproof vests
to police dogs). Such organizations recognize that “[t]hese courageous animals
risk their lives every day helping to keep our communities safe,” and invite the
public to learn how to participate in “providing the protection K-9 law
enforcement officers need and deserve.” Id.
248. See Brian Palmer, So Help You, Dog: How Does a Canine Cop Become a
“Sworn
Officer?”,
SLATE
(Jul.
18,
2008,
1:53
PM),
http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/07/so_help_you_dog.ht
ml. One version of an oath is: “I am forever your friend. I will serve and protect
you with all my might, and be loyal to the very end.” Officer card, Valparaiso
Police Dept., Ind. (on file with author).
249. Palmer, supra note 248.
250. Id.
257. Id.
252. See id. at 257; Animal Cruelty Laws, supra note 246.
253. Palmer, supra note 248.
254. Police Dog, supra note 246; see, e.g., Tonia Moxley, Police Dog Given an
Officer’s Funeral, ROANOKE TIMES (Dec. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.roanoke.com/news/nrv/wb/187837.
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ongoing story of co-evolution.”255 More concisely even, this
review demonstrates how, “Man took the (free) wolf and
made the (servant) dog and made civilization possible.”256
V. MANUFACTURING A SUPER DOG
Dogs are closer to humans than any other animal in
that they “share common interior sentiment [that is]
evident in the differences they each manifest within their
own species.”257 Indeed, “no animal other than dogs, with the
possible exception of apes, comes as close to people in
affective terms, nor does any make a stronger claim to be
treated as human. . . . [Dogs] occupy a singular space
between human culture and the rest of the animal world.”258
Domesticated dogs are nominally the same species as their
wilder cousins, wolves.259 However, the relationship between
humans and their dogs is far different than that between
humans and wolves. As this Part will show, unlike wolves,
dogs are often seen as integral components of the human
household or as fellow workers.
Importantly, this Part will also demonstrate that
although the public’s (and courts’) comfort and familiarity
with dogs have clouded the perception of the animals as
advancing technology, in fact, “genetics-based breeding
programs with the intended goal of enhancing drugdetection dog capabilities are in place.”260 For example,
continued breeding of dogs with jackals to create “super
sniffer dogs” shows substantial technological advancement
in the realm of dog production for the use of detection.261
Cloning, scientific breeding, and innovative training tactics

255. HARAWAY 2008, supra note 194, at 29.
256. Id. at 28.
257. Martin Wallen, Foxhounds, Curs, and the Dawn of Breeding: The
Discourse of Modern Human-Canine Relations, 79 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 125, 133
(2011).
258. Aaron Skabelund, Breeding Racism: The Imperial Battlefields of the
“German” Shepherd Dog, 16 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 354, 357 (2008).
259. Bringing
Wolves
Home,
NOVA
(Nov.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/nature/wolves-yellowstone.html.
260. Lunney, supra note 37, at 829.
261. Id. at 895 n.312.

11,

1997),
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demonstrate that dogs are not a static area of technology.262
The material history of dog breeding highlights a focus on
improvement and advancement that belies the popular
perception of dogs as simply “Man’s best friend.” The
following two subparts frame these arguments through the
history of dog breeding and its relevance to police dogs in
the United States.
A. The History of Scientific Breeding
Although dogs have been working with humans in
various capacities for much of human history, it was not
until the introduction of studbooks for the English foxhound
and then the greyhound in the early nineteenth century
that dogs were intentionally bred following a scientific
method.263 Most other breeds had to wait until the
publication of the Kennel Club Stud Book in 1874 for their
pedigrees to be fully instituted.264 Consequently, most dog
breeds did not exist as they appear now until after the
Napoleonic wars.265 Canine typologies were developed
decades prior to that, however, as part of the larger
movement towards a discourse of “improvement” that was
typical of the Agricultural Revolution.266 “As the privileged
traits were isolated and distilled . . . they incurred demands
that their purity be preserved,” scholar Martin Wallen
writes.267 This perceived purity was based on a set of
established criteria that determined coloring, shape, size,
and ideal behavior.268 Dogs that followed these criteria “were
imagined as possessing purity of blood. The ability to mold
the bodies of animals through strict control over
262. See id. at 897.
263. See Wallen, supra note 257, at 127. It is not entirely clear what Wallen
means by this. Competing accounts suggest that the English foxhound was
originally bred in the 16th century, as a hunting dog for the court of Henry VIII.
See, e.g., English Foxhound, K9WIRE.COM, http://www.k9wire.com/DogBreeds/english-foxhound.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2012).
264. HARRIET RITVO, THE ANIMAL ESTATE: THE ENGLISH AND OTHER CREATURES
(1987).

IN THE VICTORIAN AGE 96

265. Wallen, supra note 257, at 128.
266. Id. at 129.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 132.
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reproduction, the elimination of certain offspring, and the
recording of bloodlines in pedigrees bolstered these
illusions.”269 The dog’s traits were recorded in breed
taxonomies, which provided the knowledge that any
individual dog will most likely “act within a limited range of
possibilities,” determined by information provided by the
dog’s pedigree history.270
More so than for any other individual species, selective
breeding of the domestic dog has resulted in astounding
morphological diversity.271 Such selective breeding initially
followed function, but the institution of dog shows and their
ensuing popularity made the aesthetic perspective
paramount.272 Along with the focus on aesthetics came
myriad problems for both dogs and their breeders. For
instance, there are now over 350 known diseases and
conditions that plague pedigree dogs.273
B. Breeding Police Dogs
Writing about the German Shepherd dog and its breed
history, one scholar depicted how the breed moved from a
“valuable assistant of humans as a herder of sheep and
other livestock” to “an agent of social control.”274 The same
scholar also argued:
[T]he Shepherd Dog probably has been the most widely
represented [dog breed] in national and colonial armies. . . . [T]he
breed so dominated canine law enforcement ranks in the United
States that it came to be referred to as simply the “Police Dog” . . .
[and] they are also often imagined as the stereotypical guard
275
dog.

Indeed, the German Shepherd is the most commonly
used breed in law enforcement and in militaries around the
269. Skabelund, supra note 258, at 355.
270. Wallen, supra note 257, at 132.
271. Cf. JULIET CLUTTON-BROCK, A NATURAL HISTORY
MAMMALS 49 (1999).

OF

DOMESTICATED

272. See E. Anne McBride et al., The Pedigree Dog—Aesthetics Versus Ethics
and Law, 5 J. VETERINARY BEHAV. 51, 51 (2010).
273. Id.
274. See Skabelund, supra note 258, at 357-58.
275. Id. at 358.
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world, with the Belgian Malinois as a close second.276 A
short time after the German Shepherd breed was recognized
by the American Kennel Club in the 1920s, it also became
one of the most popular dogs in Britain, where it was
renamed “Alsatian” due to the anti-German anxiety
following WWI.277 This breed, which was initially developed
in 1899, spread quickly both in terms of popularity and
use.278 In the United States, several types of dogs, other
than the German shepherd, have been used for drug
detection, including Golden Retrievers, Belgian Malinois,
Labrador Retrievers, and English Springer Spaniels.279
Some agencies prefer Labrador Retrievers because of their
amiability.280
Early on, detection dogs were obtained from animal
shelters,281 but this was found problematic due to the very
low success rates associated with training such dogs.282 In
fact, “approximately 1 shelter dog of 1000 passes the basic
tests that serve to admit a dog to a formal training program;
of those that pass, only a small fraction (perhaps 1 in 40-50)
eventually pass a full training program and become certified
search dogs.”283
276. See Lunney, supra note 37, at 835 (citing TRACY L. ENGLISH, OFFICE
HISTORY, LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, THE QUIET AMERICANS: A HISTORY
MILITARY WORKING DOGS 23 (2000)); Simmons, supra note 99, at 428 n.105.

OF
OF

277. See Skabelund, supra note 257, at 355.
278. Id. at 354-55.
279. See Simmons, supra note 99, at 428 n.105.
280. See Lunney, supra note 37, at 835 n.22; see also Gardiner Harris, To
Serve and Protect, and Sniff Out Trouble, an International Dog of Mystery, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2011, at A16 (noting the popularity of Labrador Retrievers among
United States soldiers serving overseas).
281. See Bird, supra note 66, at 411.
282. For a similar account in the South African context involving controlled
study groups of puppies, see J.M. Slabbert & J.S.J. Odendaal, Early Prediction
of Adult Police Dog Efficiency—A Longitudinal Study, 64 APPLIED ANIMAL
BEHAV. SCI. 269, 269 (1999) (“Up to 70% of dogs that were bred at the South
African Police Service Dog Breeding Centre . . . were not suitable for use.”).
283. NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, GUIDE FOR THE SELECTION OF DRUG
DETECTORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATIONS 21 (2000), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183260.pdf; see DAVID G. MYERS, PSYCHOLOGY
249 (2d ed. 1989) (“Animals can most easily learn and retain behaviors that
draw on their biological predispositions . . . .”).
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Although dog breeding for police forces is constantly on
the rise, most American police dogs are still imported from
Europe.284 Dogs imported from Hungary, Slovakia, and the
Czech Republic are descendants of the border patrol dogs
bred during the Cold War, and other dogs are purchased by
United States agencies through brokers in Holland and
Germany.285 Breeding information that traces selected dogs’
ancestry at least six generations back is readily available,286
and specific training sites list the breeds used by police,
including
German
Shepherds,
Belgian
Malinois,
bloodhounds, Dutch Shepherds, and mixed breeds.287
According to one American training center, breeders look for
dog breeds that walk on slick floors, socialize around people,
and possess good nerves, civility, strong bites, and a strong
hold; they also look for dogs with good pack instincts and
that are capable of working in small, dark areas.288

284. History of the Belgian Malinois, NORTH AMERICA K-9 SERVICES, LLC,
http://www.police-dog.net/pages/belgianmalinois.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2012);
see
also
Deborah
Palman,
Obtaining
and
Selecting
Dogs
for
Police
Work,
U.S.
POLICE
CANINE
ASS’N,
http://www.uspcak9.com/training/canineselection.html (last visited Oct. 8,
2012).
285. NORTH AMERICA K-9 SERVICES, LLC, supra note 284; see also JAMES R.
ENGEL, THE POLICE DOG: HISTORY, BREEDS AND SERVICE, available at
http://www.angelplace.net/Book/Ch8.pdf.
286. A pedigree database documents breeders and kennels from around the
world.
See
Search
Breeders,
PEDIGREE
DATABASE,
http://www.pedigreedatabase.com/german_shepherd_dog/breeders.html
(last
visited Oct. 8, 2012).
287. See USK9 UNLIMITED, http://usk9.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012);
Breeding, USK9 UNLIMITED, http://www.usk9.com/breeding.php (last visited Oct.
WORKING
DOGS,
8,
2012);
see
also
ULTIMATE
http://www.ultimateworkingdogs.com/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
288. Patrol Dogs, USK9 UNLIMITED, http://www.usk9.com/patroldogs.php (last
visited Oct. 8, 2012). The following excerpt provides interesting guidelines to
police officers about how to choose their work dogs:
In choosing a puppy, the handler should first watch the pups as a pack
and observe each one. The ideal choice is an aggressive, self-confident
pup who shows leadership over the others, and who will readily
approach you as a stranger without hesitation or fear. Ideally the
search is for the Alpha male of the litter, or the next closest prospect
depending on temperament. Those who have an opportunity to see the
pups suckling the mother will note that the leaders of the litter almost
always will be the ones using the teats nearest the mother’s front legs.
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Specific dog clubs set even higher standards for their
dogs. For example, the German Shepherd Dog Club of
America requires that their dogs be “strong, agile, well
muscled animal[s], alert and full of life,” and details specific
standards that apply to the dogs’ every aspect, including
their general appearance, temperament, size, substance,
head, topline, fore- and hind-quarters, and gait.289 This, for
example, is how the website describes a good gait:
The gait is outreaching, elastic, seemingly without effort, smooth
and rhythmic, covering the maximum amount of ground with the
minimum number of steps. At a walk it covers a great deal of
ground, with long stride of both hind legs and forelegs. At a trot
the dog covers still more ground with even longer stride, and
moves powerfully but easily, with coordination and balance so
that the gait appears to be the steady motion of a well-lubricated
290
machine.

German Shepherd breeders are often required to show a
signed pedigree, current health record, registration papers,
sales contract, and a feeding schedule including amount and
type, if available.291 Similarly, the American Belgian
Malinois Club provides detailed breeding instructions that
These teats yield more milk and therefore the dominant pups force the
others to less lucrative positions.
Beware of pups that whine, howl or bark constantly when excited as
these habits may be hard to break and can be extremely annoying.
These pups are very often anxious and although in other tests may rate
high, they may have a tendency to be high strung and are often hard to
settle down. . . .
....
Older pups, in the six- to eight-month age range can also be given the
gun test. Put the pup on a leash and have a suspect with a revolver
containing blank loads suddenly appear and fire a few rounds into the
air. The pup may balk a bit, but as long as he doesn’t break and try to
run or show a lot of fear or anxiety, he should prove satisfactory.
R.S. EDEN, DOG TRAINING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 24-25 (1985).
289. German Shepherd Dog Breed Standard, THE GERMAN SHEPHERD DOG
CLUB OF AMERICA, http://gsdca.org/german-shepherd-dogs/education (last visited
Oct. 8, 2012).
290. Id. (note the analogy to the machine toward the end of the quote).
291. Will a Breeder Ask Me Questions?, THE GERMAN SHEPHERD DOG CLUB OF
AMERICA, http://gsdca.org/german-shepherd-dogs/choosing-a-puppy/good-buyergood-breeder (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
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highlight the dogs’ herding, tracking, agility, and obedience
capacities that render it particularly fit for police work. 292
The club also has its own breeding code of ethics. 293
Although German Shepherds and American Belgian
Malinois make up the majority of dogs used by law
enforcement for detection tasks, since 1976 the United
States Air Force has been training smaller breeds for
similar work.294 Examples of these breeds include beagles
and cocker spaniels, which have the “advantage of easily
searching closed spaces that were inaccessible to German
shepherd[s].”295
In summary, the nature of detection dogs—in fact, their
very genotype and phenotype—are the result of a long and
detailed process of co-evolution.296 As STS scholars have
noted in other contexts, “[p]edigrees documented a direct

292. See
AMERICAN
BELGIAN
MALINOIS
CLUB,
http://www.malinoisclub.com/abmc/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012); Breeder Code of
Ethics,
AMERICAN
BELGIAN
MALINOIS
CLUB
(ABMC),
http://www.malinoisclub.com/abmc/abmc-breeder-information/abmc-breedercode-of-ethics (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
293. Breeder Code of Ethics, supra note 292. The club’s website lists a few
ways to identify a reputable breeder: mother and father over two years old,
copies of all health clearances, pictures, and references of a three-generation
pedigree, buyer screening, production of a written contract, and experience or
knowledge of the breed. See Identify a Reputable Breeder, AMERICAN BELGIAN
MALINOIS
CLUB,
http://www.malinoisclub.com/abmc/abmc-breederinformation/identify-a-reputable-breeder (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
294. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at C-1-3.
295. Id. at C-1-3, C-1-7. Beyond the use of detection dogs for policing purposes,
the USDA has also used dogs to detect screwworm infestations in cattle
and the presence of brown tree snakes in aircraft. Australian shepherds
have been used to indicate when cows are fertile so that farmers can
breed them at the right time during their short estrus. Beagles are
increasingly used to precisely locate termites in buildings to avoid the
necessity of treating the entire structure. . . . Dogs have been used to
perform ecological studies of wildlife by indicating on the scats of
specific animals, demonstrating that certain species are present in an
area under study.
Id. at C-1-6.
296. DONNA HARAWAY, THE COMPANION SPECIES MANIFESTO: DOGS, PEOPLE, AND
SIGNIFICANT OTHERNESS 29 (2003).
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lineal connection to the landscape in its primordiality and
the telos that made a dog anything but accidental.”297
VI. COTRAINING K-9S AND HANDLERS
Dogs and humans are not only coproduced through
breeding; they are also actively trained to affect each other’s
behaviors. This Part discusses such coproduction through
training. According to the Oxford Dictionary, training is
“the action of teaching a person or animal a particular skill
or type of behaviour.”298 Dogs are increasingly taught to
detect a variety of substances. In this sense, they are
substantially different from machines, which are
“programmed” rather than “trained.” At the same time, the
scientific involvement in producing the dog sniff event and
the extraction of particular knowledge from this event also
make the dog into a technology. Detection dogs work closely
with their human partners in law enforcement—the latter
referred to as “handlers”—and are often rigorously trained
and managed to properly fulfill their duties.
Philosopher Jacques Derrida writes that during the last
two centuries, human-animal relations have been
dominated by “forms of knowledge, which remain
inseparable from techniques of intervention into their
object, [and] from the transformation of the actual object . . .
namely, the living animal.”299 The production of such forms
of knowledge about canine behavior in this context enables
the training of both humans and dogs. Through examining
this training in the context of the dog-handler-trainerbreeder assemblage, this Part highlights the tensions that
exist between the dog’s identity as a natural entity that
shares an intimate relationship with humans and the dog’s
identity as a technology—scientifically bred, trained, and
interpreted by humans for surveillance ends.
In my interview with a canine police officer, the officer
commented that dogs are less fallible than machines. “At
the end of the day,” he said, “the dog is a dog. It’s not a
297. Wallen, supra note 257, at 141.
298. Definition of Training, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/training (last visited Oct.
22, 2012).
299. See Wallen, supra note 257, at 126 (discussing Jacques Derrida’s account
of two centuries of human-animal relations) (emphasis omitted).
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machine. It’s not subject to fail like the belt system on the
machine. This is an amazing animal.”300 As I have shown,
some courts have treated dog sniffs similarly as removed
from human error and as belonging to their own, sui
generis, natural category. The following subparts will
demonstrate that in reality, the dogs’ detection skills are
intimately linked with those of their human handlers, in the
same way that any complex technology is dependent on the
skills of its operators. Whether highly or poorly trained,
detection dogs are actively produced. In this sense, too, dogs
are a biotechnology.
A. K-9 Training Institutions in the United States
The police dog is trained to assist the police with their
work.301 Federal, state, and municipal police have each
developed their own organizations, centers, and methods for
training detection dogs. There are currently at least thirtyone state police K-9 associations and twenty-three regional
and national level police K-9 associations.302 A number of
government agencies train dogs specifically to detect drugs,
including the United States Department of Defense, the
United States Department of Agriculture—Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS), and the
United States Customs Service.303 Outside of the federal
government, “[the Auburn University program] is the
largest K-9 research program in the United States.”304
Auburn has “twenty-five trainers, who supply about one
hundred dogs a year to Amtrak, Federal Protective Services,
and police departments around the country.”305

300. Interview with anonymous canine officer (June 19, 2012).
301. See Obtaining and Selecting Dogs for Police Work, U.S. POLICE CANINE
ASS’N, http://www.uspcak9.com/training/canineselection.html (last visited June
1, 2012).
302. See
Associations,
EDEN
CONSULTING
GROUP,
http://www.policek9.com/html/associations.html (last visited May 31, 2012).
303. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 1-1-5, C-1-2 to C-1-3.
304. Canine Detection Research Institute—CDRI, AUBURN U. C. VETERINARY
MED., http://www.vetmed.auburn.edu/cdri (last visited May 31, 2012).
305. Bilger, supra note 1, at 54.
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The average cost of basic K-9 training is $21,000, which
includes ten weeks of lessons for the handler.306 There is
even a police K-9 magazine and Web site, replete with K-9
apparel that includes bite sleeves for $95 each,307
“temperature monitoring/alert system” for K-9 vehicles for
$849,308 and a K-9 BSD 2, which is a “remote-controlled
device designed to eject a variety of motivational toys to a
short distance, creating prey for [training dogs],” for $627.309
The following few paragraphs will focus on New York State
as an example of the use of police dogs at the state level.
The New York State Police created the Division of
Canine Unit in 1975.310 Initially, three troopers received the
specialized training for canine handlers and were assigned
to canines purchased from the United States Army for
$10,000.311 These first few canines were initially used as
explosives detection dogs in preparation for the 1980 Winter
Olympic Games in Lake Placid, New York.312 New York
police chose the Baltimore Police Department as its training
agency.313 At the time, Baltimore had one of the largest
canine units in the United States and was experimenting
with what was later referred to as the “Baltimore Method”
of training.314 Still quite popular, the Baltimore Method
“dictate[s] that the canines be sociable, that they be allowed

306. Id.
K-9
307. Bite
Suit
Arm
Sleeve,
POLICE
http://onlinestore.policek9magazine.net/products/BITE-SUIT-ARMSLEEVE.html (last visited May 31, 2012).

MAG.,

308. Premier Canine System™ by Criminalistics, Inc., POLICE K-9 MAG.,
http://onlinestore.policek9magazine.net/products/Premier-Canine-System™-bycriminalistics%2C-Inc.html (last visited May 31, 2012).
309. K9
Behavior
Shaping
Device
BSD2,
POLICE
K-9
MAG.,
http://onlinestore.policek9magazine.net/products/K9-Behavior-Shaping-DeviceBSD-2.html (last visited May 31, 2012).
310. Canine Unit, N.Y. ST., DIV. OF ST. POLICE, CANINE UNIT, available at
http://www.troopers.ny.gov/Specialized_Services/Canine_Unit/ (last visited May
31, 2012).
311. Id. That the police purchased these dogs from the military further
demonstrates the strong interconnections between army dogs and police dogs
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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around the general public, and that they reside in the
handlers[’] residence[s].”315
In 1978, the Division of State Police started training its
own canines, and in 2000 the Canine Unit settled into a
state-of-the-art training facility in Cooperstown, New
York.316 According to its website, New York’s canine unit
currently has sixty-six teams, including “thirty-one
explosives detection canine teams, thirty-two narcotics
detection canine teams, and three bloodhound teams,”
utilized exclusively for tracking.317 All canines are donated
to the unit at no cost “through Humane Societies, private
citizens, and breeders from across the northeast.”318 These
canines are then subject to a rigorous screening process that
identifies the most suitable dogs for the twenty-week “Basic
Handler School.”319 During this period, “a new handler and
a[n] untrained canine are teamed together and undergo a
strenuous program during which the teams are instructed
in: basic obedience, agility, handler protection, either
narcotics or explosives detection, tracking, building
searches, veterinary first aid, and land navigation—map
and compass course.”320 After completing this training, the
dog-human teams are sent out on patrol and must receive
biannual recertification.321 The following paragraphs explore
the nature of this coproduced human-dog team by drawing
on an example of dog detection cotraining by the USDA.

315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. The Canine Unit website contains fantastic images of all its K-9
officers. New York State Canine Unit Photo Gallery, DIV. ST. POLICE,
http://www.troopers.ny.gov/Specialized_Services/Canine_Unit/Canine_Gallery/
(last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
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B. The Human-Dog Team
Canine teams consist of a dog and handler, or canine
enforcement officer, working as partners.322 As of 2012,
approximately 630 canine teams were employed by the
United States Customs Service at airports, seaports, and
border checkpoints. These teams have all been certified
following a rigorous training course.323 As Robert Bird
explains, the training course of custom service dogs allows
no room for error, accounting for the low number of teams
that pass:
Custom Service dogs are trained to disregard potential
distractions such as food, harmless drugs, and residual scents.
Agents present distractions such as loud gunshots during
training, rewarding the dogs when those diversions are ignored.
The teams must complete a certification exam in which the dog
and handler must detect marijuana, hashish, heroin, and cocaine
in a variety of environments. This exam and the following annual
re-certifications must be completed perfectly, with no false alerts
and no missed drugs. If a dog and handler team alerts
erroneously, the team must undergo remedial training. If the
team fails again, the team is disbanded and the dog is
324
permanently relieved from duty.

In what follows, I mainly draw on the USDA training
guidelines to explore in detail the process of human-dog
training.325 Although police training differs in certain
respects from training by the USDA, they share similar
assumptions and common detection goals.
322. JOHN E. PARMETER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE FOR THE
SELECTION OF DRUG DETECTORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATIONS 21 (2000)
[hereinafter NIJ GUIDE].
323. Id. at 21, 23.
324. Bird, supra note 66, at 414-15.
325. I chose to focus on the USDA training manual because it was publicly
available; I was unable to obtain detailed police training manuals, probably
because such manuals are considered a trade secret by the United States
government. See, e.g., About US K-9 Unlimited, USK9 UNLIMITED,
http://www.usk9.com/about.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (claiming to use
proprietary techniques that have been deemed a trade secret by the United
States government); see also Bird, supra note 66, at 421 (“Formal training
manuals may detail training procedures. However, producing portions of the
manual in court may not be possible since it would compromise investigative
techniques.”).
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USDA-APHIS, working with United States Customs,
began a detector dog program in 1984 in Los Angeles.326 This
program consisted of a single canine team, a beagle and a
handler, situated at the Los Angeles International
Airport.327 Two years later, APHIS coordinated with the
military’s existing detector dog training program at
Lackland Air Force Base to expand and train canine teams
for service with the USDA.328 This early training course was
mostly modeled after the Air Force’s methods, but APHIS
began training its own teams at regional centers in 1988. 329
By 1997, program growth and changing training methods
led to the creation of the National Detector Dog Training
Center, which currently provides trained detector dogs not
only to major ports across the United States, but also “to
mail facilities, land border crossings, and ports that handle
cargo.”330
The use of detection dogs by law enforcement agencies
is expanding rapidly. For example, the USDA’s vision
statement states that it seeks to “deploy detector dogs in all
areas where they can be most effectively utilized and
integrated into the operations of APHIS and the PPQ”
(Plant Protection Quarantine) and to “[successfully
integrate the detector dog activity into the agricultural
quarantine inspection operation,” including: “baggage
clearance at airports, maritime ports, ships, and military
facilities; international mail and small parcel clearance;
bulk and containerized cargo clearance at airports and
maritime ports; vehicle, cargo, and baggage clearance at
land border crossings; and smuggling interdiction in all
venues.”331
The USDA provides concrete examples of how dogs are
coproduced and codisciplined into desired behaviors.332 Its
Basic Canine Officer Training Course is mandatory for all

326. USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 1-1-4 to 1-1-5.
327. Id. at 1-1-4.
328. Id. at 1-1-5.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1-1-6; see also id. at 1-1-2.
332. See id. at 4-1-1 to 4-1-11.
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canine officers.333 The course lasts ten weeks and is
structured “to accommodate various pathways . . . including
passenger clearance, cargo control, and border control.”334
The manual describes the goals of each week’s training
program.335 During the first week, the “[s]tudents learn the
basic terminology necessary for discussing canine structures
relevant to scent detection work (i.e., olfactory apparatus)
and health (e.g., hips, spine, other skeletal landmarks,
placement of internal organs).”336 This is important because
“[m]astering this terminology is necessary for precise
communication about canine health, maintenance, and
handling directions.”337 Also during the first week students
learn
[T]he basics of canine behavior, which is the foundation for all
training. This training component covers fundamental concepts
relating to canine behavior (e.g., behavioral tendencies, instincts,
requirements, treatment, types of conditioning and learning,
reward schedules, and motivation) as they apply to handling a
scent detection canine and troubleshooting performance-related
difficulties. Time is devoted to sharpening students’ abilities to
observe and analyze canine behavior, emphasizing skills that will
help them keep their detector dogs safe, healthy, and working
338
proficiently.

At the end of the first week of training, handlers are paired
with their actual dogs. “Students begin their new
relationships with their detector dogs by learning how to
establish a rapport. Activities include hands-on experience
such as grooming their dogs (e.g., bathing, cleaning ears,
and trimming nails).”339
Next, from week two through five, a human-canine
relationship is fostered and established:340

333. Id. at 4-1-1.
334. Id.
335. See id. at 4-1-1 to 4-1-11.
336. Id. at 4-1-3.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 4-1-3.
340. See id. at 4-1-4.
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Students learn to observe their dogs to determine what rewards
are most likely to elicit or enhance their strong desire, persistence,
and enthusiasm to work. . . . Although the standard reward is
food, some dogs perform most effectively when food is combined
with other types of rewards or reinforcers (e.g., towel, ball, etc.).
Students . . . use this information to create a meaningful reward
341
system for their detector dogs.

Clearly, information is not helpful in the abstract; it must
be situated—and here, based on the peculiarities of each
dog. Although not mentioned explicitly in the USDA
manual, such situated knowledge should also be based on
the concrete strengths and weaknesses of the dog’s human
handler.
The importance of a bidirectional (or human-dog)
learning system is articulated explicitly by Auburn
University’s Canine Detection Research Institute. The
institute’s training and education Web page states, in
particular, that:
As part of a university, we provide state-of-the-art teaching
methodologies to ensure that our clients receive not only the most
educated dogs, but the best educated handlers possible. These
teaching methods not only focus on our human counter parts, but
also on our canine partners. We recognize that it is vital to both
humans and canines to present advanced information in a manner
that it can quickly and easily be learned. By focusing on the
education of the dog and the handler, we can eliminate weak links
342
and maximize the strengths of our canine handler teams.

Indeed, “[p]erforming a canine narcotics search requires
much more than a person to keep the dog on the leash while
it sniffs for drugs.”343 Instead, “dog and trainer work closely
together as a team.”344 The United States Air Force Court of
Military Review summarized dog and handler teamwork as
follows:
341. Id.; see also Oregon v. Foster, 252 P.3d 292, 295, 296 (Or. 2011)
(discussing how officers trained their dogs to detect drugs through playing
games with tennis balls).
342. Training and Education, AUBURN UNIV. CANINE VETERINARY MED.,
http://www.vetmed.auburn.edu/cdri/cdri-services/training-and-education
(last
visited May 30, 2012).
343. Bird, supra note 66, at 422.
344. Id.
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Clearly, the dog and handler function as an integral team. The
dog is the sensor, and the handler is the trainer and interpreter.
The handler’s performance in both roles is inseparably
intertwined with the dog’s overall reliability rate. And since the
net result is the product of the interaction between two living
345
beings, both roles of the handler are highly subjective.

From weeks two to five of USDA’s training program, the
human students learn how to use their voice.346 In the
language of the manual: “Quality, pitch, and tone of voice
convey meaningful information to dogs. Students learn the
importance of consistency in their use of words, and to
identify the effects of different voice qualities.”347 The
manual also details that:
Once they master the basic presentation skills, [the students] are
introduced to [practical search] techniques that are meant to
enhance work efficiency with their detector dogs. These
techniques include the following:
1. Search Patterns—How to move a dog and move with a dog
around typical obstacles and luggage to maximize coverage
of the search.
2. Breathing Bags—How to assist a dog in detecting odors
within luggage by pushing air out of the bags at the
appropriate time.
3. Tap Backs—How to provide a dog a second chance to
examine a piece of luggage without interrupting the flow of
the search.

345. Id. (quoting United States v. Paulson, 2 M.J. 326, 330 n.5 (A.F.C.M.R.
1976), remanded by 7 M.J. 43 (C.M.A. 1979). The importance of the particular
handler-dog bond was emphasized by the respondent in Florida v. Harris, who
suggested that this should be the major ground for finding Aldo’s sniff in that
case unreliable:
And we have to remember that this certificate, not only was it 16
months out of date, it wasn’t a certificate for Aldo. It was a certificate
for Aldo and a Seminole County deputy together as a team.
This dog was never certified as part of a team with Officer Wheetley in
this case. And the certifications in this area are team certifications, not
individual certifications.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Harris, supra note 168, at 32.
346. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 4-1-4, 4-1-6.
347. Id. at 4-1-6.
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4. Pinpointing—How to induce a dog to be specific when
indicating on an odor source either by touching with its nose
348
or with its paw.

As this passage makes clear, detection dogs do not work
alone. Their human handlers move through spaces
alongside them, blowing air out of luggage at appropriate
moments (also called “burping”349) and providing second
sniffing opportunities when deemed necessary.350 At its best,
the dog detection work is not a technical or mechanical
process that occurs without human interference. In fact,
good detection work requires an intimate relationship
between the dog and its handler, including cross-species
interpretive skills: “Handlers interpret their dogs’ signals,
and the handler alone makes the final decision whether a
dog has detected narcotics.”351 A canine officer explained to
me along these lines that “the dog doesn’t know that people
usually keep their drugs in glove compartments or places
like that—and this is where my experience steps in. I have
to always think: why did she behave a little differently
here?”352 Human handlers affect the work of dogs as much
as the dogs’ capacities and incapacities affect human work.
Finally, in weeks six through nine of the USDA’s
training course, dogs and humans move to work in “real”
environments.353 According to the manual, “[t]he training
occurs at an international airport, an international border,
or an international cargo receiving area that closely
simulates the environment in which the detector dog teams
will eventually work.”354 Not only are the human handlers
trained to modify their behavior according to their dogs;
dogs, too, are trained rigorously during the course to
respond to their handlers’ instincts rather than their own.
For example, one trainer told the New Yorker: “We have to
have an animal that’s willing to consummate its aggression
on a living, breathing human, then contain it enough to
348. Id. at 4-1-7.
349. See interview with anonymous canine officer, supra note 300.
350. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 4-1-7.
351. See Bird, supra note 66, at 425.
352. See interview with anonymous canine officer, supra note 300.
353. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 4-1-7.
354. Id.
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come back to you. . . . That’s a lot to ask of any being, much
less a dog.”355 At the same time, dog and handler must
modify their behaviors to fit the relevant spatial setting in
which they both operate.356 Donna Haraway’s words in the
general context of working dogs are thus highly relevant
also here:
Dogs’ roles have been multifaceted, and they have not been
passive raw material to the action of others. Further, dogs have
not been unchangeable animals confined to supposedly ahistorical
order of nature. Nor have people emerged unaltered from the
interactions. Relations are constitutive; dogs and people are
emergent as historical beings, as subjects and objects to each
357
other precisely through the verbs of their relating.

People and dogs, Haraway contends, are “mutually
adapted partners in . . . naturecultures.”358 Scent detection
dogs are, by definition, products of their breeding and
training by humans.
C. Are Dogs Infallible? Additional Human Influences on
Dog Alerts
Alongside the formal dog-handler training, there is
another way in which humans—and handlers in
particular—affect the operation of their dogs. As
acknowledged by Justice Souter in his important dissent in
Caballes,359 the Florida Supreme Court in Jardines360 and
Harris,361 and the Oregon Supreme Court in Foster362 and
Helzer363—dogs are not infallible. They may produce “false
alerts,”364 not only in response to their handlers’
355. Bilger, supra note 1, at 52.
362. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 4-1-7.
357. HARAWAY 2008, supra note 194, at 62.
358. Id.
359. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410-16 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
360. Florida v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d 34, 40 (Fla. 2011).
361. Harris v. Florida, 71 So. 3d 756, 771-72 (Fla. 2011).
362. Oregon v. Foster, 252 P.3d 292, 297-300 (Or. 2011).
363. Oregon v. Helzer, 252 P.3d 288, 289-91 (Or. 2011).
364. Or, in other words, a “false positive.” See Jeff Weiner, Police K-9’s and the
Constitution: What Every Lawyer and Judge Should Know, THE NAT’L ASS’N OF
CRIM. DEF. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 23. Every dog alert has four possible outcomes: a
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unintentional cues,365 but also because of residual or trace
odors that linger on an object, even though it has never
actually touched an illegal drug.366 In the oral arguments in
Florida v. Harris, the respondent argued along these lines:
And we know from the studies that have been cited in the briefs
that there are other reasons that dogs alert when that alert
dog positively alerts and drugs are found; a dog does not alert and no drugs are
present (these two first outcomes are “correct”); failing to alert when drugs are
present (a “false negative”); and alerting when drugs are not present (a “false
positive”). See Bird, supra note 66, at 427.
365. Based on interviews with investigators from narcotic divisions, Robert Bird
concludes that “[i]n fact, almost all erroneous alerts originate not from the dog,
but from the handler’s misinterpretation of the dog’s signals.” Bird, supra note
66, at 422, 422 n.124. Bird adds:
Canines often have their own particular pattern for communicating an
alert. If a handler is not aware of a dog’s particular behavior, she may
mistake an indication of narcotics for a reaction to food, another
animal, or other distraction. Skilled handlers also receive training for a
specific type of substance or environment, and should pass annual
recertification tests.
Id. at 423.
Finally, Bird notes that,
[t]rained handlers often train and remain with one canine in practice,
developing a close bond with the dog and a keen eye for interpreting
that particular canine’s habits.
Handlers must also know how to avoid “handler cues.” Handler cues
are conscious or unconscious signals given from the handler that can
lead a detection dog to where the handler thinks drugs are located.
These voice or physical signals can compromise a dog’s objectivity and
impermissibly lead the dog to alert at the suspected item or person.
Handler cues can be corrected in training by conducting practice sniffs
where both the dog and handler do not know where the drugs are
located.
Id. at 423-24.
366. Weiner, supra note 364, at 22-23. A recent study found that
approximately 90% of all paper money circulating in the United States contains
traces of cocaine; this situation presents additional challenges to police detection
work. See David Biello, Cocaine Contaminates Majority of U.S. Currency, SCI.
AM. (Aug. 16, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=cocainecontaminates-majority-of-american-currency. According to the canine officer I
interviewed, however, there is no such thing as a false alert. See interview with
anonymous canine officer, supra note 300. He explained that the dog is trained
to detect odor, not actual drugs, and that it is thus practically impossible to
prove that there was no odor present. Id.
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cannot be verified. Handler cueing is identified as the chief one.
And simply dogs make mistakes. Dogs err. Dogs get excited and
will alert to things like tennis balls in trunks or animals, that sort
367
of thing.

According to the Chicago Tribune, “analysis of three years
of data for suburban departments found that only 44
percent of those alerts by the dogs led to the discovery of
drugs or paraphernalia. For Hispanic drivers, the success
rate was just 27 percent.”368 The Tribune continues:
Even advocates for the use of drug-sniffing dogs agree with
experts who say many dog-and-officer teams are poorly trained
and prone to false alerts that lead to unjustified searches. Leading
a dog around a car too many times or spending too long examining
a vehicle, for example, can cause a dog to give a signal for drugs
where there are none.369

Clearly, human conduct affects K-9s far beyond what is
prescribed by their formal cotraining, and in spite of the
ideal that they should operate in a way that is unaffected by
human cues. Nevertheless, in most states “dog teams are
not held to any statutory standard of performance” or
certification.370
367. Transcript of Oral Argument, Harris, supra note 168, at 41.
368. Dan Hinkel & Joe Mahr, Drug Dogs Often Wrong, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2011,
at 1.
369. Id.
370. Id. But see Police Dog Training Standards, EDEN CONSULTING GROUP,
http://www.policek9.com/html/standards.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2012)
(discussing varying standards in Arizona, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, and Utah). Additionally, the United States Police Canine Association
recently published its Certification Rules and Regulations. Certification Rules
and Regulations, U.S. POLICE CANINE ASS’N INC. (2012), available at
http://www.uspcak9.com/certification/USPCARulebook2012.pdf. The Association
places several requirements on both dogs and handlers. For example, handlers
are required to maintain total control over their dogs at all times; they must
use the briefest commands possible; and their use of a dog’s name before
instruction is defined as a “double command” and penalized as such. See id. at 3.
Agility tests required for certification include hurdles, catwalk, broad jump, Aframe, and crawl. Id. at 4. These tests are completed based on the tester’s choice
of picket fence, chain link fence, simulated brick wall, windows, boards, or
shrubs. Id. at 5. Tests also include evidence searches from a selection of shotgun
shells, matches, credit cards, key ring with a tab, and a metal gun, screwdriver,
or piece of leather. Id. at 6. A key evaluation component is the dog’s “alert,”
which is rated based on how it can confidently, obviously, and consistently
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In light of this troubling data, Robert Bird recommends
four important issues for courts to consider when assessing
the reliability of a narcotics training dog: 1) the amount of
training “required to produce a reliable drug dog”; 2) the
skills that “an effective dog handler should know”; 3) how to
scrutinize a canine’s accuracy rate; and 4) the conditions
under which dogs sniffs are most reliable.371
Court assessments vary. There are instances when the
courts have reviewed canine alerts that have proven “highly
effective, with many dogs maintaining a near perfect record
of narcotics detection.” In contrast, some judges have
omitted training and reliability from their evaluations,
resulting in the approval of dogs that produce erroneous
alerts and thereby unnecessary invasions of privacy.372 Bird
also notes that settled judicial standards concerning dogs’
reliability are absent and that court analysis rarely focuses
on handlers, although it should.373 Although not framed in
these terms, Bird’s study is in line with the broader
argument of this Article that the dog does not function
irrespective of the long history of its material and
behavioral coproduction and that each and every detail of
the dog’s operations is formed and circumscribed by
humans.
VII. K-9S FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LAW ENFORCERS
A. K-9s as Members of the Police Family—And as Machines
I have shown that police detection dogs are not simply
natural entities that sniff around suspect cars in the same
way that pet dogs sniff their tuna sandwich at home. That
is, they do not operate absent human influence but are,
distinguish an indication from a nonindication. See id. at 14. However, the
various industry standards are neither uniform nor mandatory across the board.

See, e.g., United States v. Prokupek, 2009 WL 2634446, at *22 (D. Neb. Aug. 24,
2009) (considering the defendant’s claim that Nebraska's training standards and
methods are inferior to the common standards by respected K-9 associations, the
court held: “There is more than one way to train a dog”).
371. Bird, supra note 66, at 407-08.
372. See id. at 407; see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 726 F.2d 661, 663-64
(10th Cir. 1984) (disregarding anomalous behavior by narcotics detection dog in
alert process).
373. See Bird, supra note 66, at 415-20.
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ideally, rigorously and continuously trained. At the same
time, the prevalent police training model encourages
handlers to raise their K-9s at home, like other members of
the family. 374 This highlights the natural, or the biological,
properties of dogs.
The notion of K-9s as family members—and as equal
members in the police family in particular—is most
prominent during times of tragedy. Here, for example, is an
excerpt from a eulogy by an officer who lost his canine in
line of service: “Last Friday morning, tragedy struck my
family. . . . It’s a love and a bond only canine handlers can
understand.”375 Another officer commented about his canine:
“Bach was an officer. He worked just as hard, and he needs
to be remembered just as much.”376 A third officer described
the death of K-9 Rocky because the dog’s handler, Craig,
was too upset to speak: “He was Craig’s partner, he was
Craig’s defender, but far more important, he was Craig’s
friend.”377 Finally, news headlines described: “Nitro the
police dog receives a hero’s sendoff.” The item read, further:
“Nitro we will miss you. The city is yours pal,” said an emotional
Sgt. Norm Webster. Nitro lost his life in the line of duty on Jan. 23
[2006] while pursuing a suspected car thief who attempted to
escape onto a stationary train. Nitro followed, and at the very
moment the dog attempted to leap onto the train, it began to
move. Nitro then slipped from the car and was run over by the
train. Those gathered at the funeral gave him a hero’s sendoff. “I
regret we lost Nitro in the manner that we did,” said Inspector
Dean Robinson of the Vancouver Police Department. “We lost one
of our own. He wasn’t just a dog, He was a loyal and dedicated

374. Or, more precisely, like near members. See id. at 412 n.55 (“A handler
living with their detection dog at home should not treat them as ordinary pets.
If pampered, the dogs will be less desirous to please their handler for rewards
on the job. This desire is important, because their reward system is primarily
based on praise and affection.”) (citing Interview with Dennis L. Trombley,
Member of the Rhode Island State Police K-9 Unit, in North Kingstown, R.I.
(July 12, 1995)). Typically, after eight or nine years of service, the dog retires to
a full pet status with his or her handler. Id. at 414.
375. See Moxley, supra note 254.
376. Beloved Florissant Police K9 Dies, CBS ST. LOUIS (Apr. 16, 2012),
http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2012/04/16/beloved-florissant-police-k9-dies/.
377. Rich Newberg, Law Enforcement Mourns Loss of K9 Rocky, WIVB.COM
(Dec. 5, 2011, 5:42 PM), http://www.wivb.com/dpp/news/crime/law-enforcementmourns-loss-of-k9-rocky.
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member of the department and he had a police identification
378
number to prove it.

These accounts illustrate the dog’s capacity to develop
intimate relationships with humans.379
Alongside the officers’ references to their K-9s as family
and friends, K-9s are often referred to by their human
coworkers as machines or technologies:
Canine police tend to talk about their dogs as if they were
mechanical devices. They describe them as tools or technology and
say that they’re “building dogs” through proper training. They say
that their animals need ‘maintenance’ to be “fully operational,”
and that a “dual-purpose dog”—one that has been taught to both
chase down criminals and detect drugs or explosives—has
380
“superior functionality.”

Along these lines, a canine officer tells me that “the dog
is accurate; always.”381 He explains: “I don’t believe that the
dog has his off days. It is a living tool for tracing people and
articles. It’s a locating tool, an extension of what we can do
as police officers, like a crowbar or pepper spray.”382
Despite their ostensible juxtaposition, the two notions—
that of dogs as part of the police family and man’s best
friend, and that of dogs as a manmade instruments serving
human detection ends—are deeply intertwined and
codependent. These concepts are part and parcel of an
378. Nitro the Police Dog Receives a Hero’s Sendoff, AR15.COM,
http://beta.ar15.com/archive/topic.html?b=1&f=5&t=434869 (last visited Nov.
26, 2012).
379. Another, older example is that of Nemo, the first sentry dog to be sent
home to the United States from Vietnam. See ENGLISH, supra note 276, at 24;
WAR STORIES, available at http://www.war-stories.com/aspprotect/pdf/377th-tsna2c-robert-a-throneburg-k9-nemo-a534-1966.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2012); In
December 1966, Nemo and his handler were patrolling in Vietnam. ENGLISH,
supra note 276, at 24. Nemo attacked after detecting a group of Viet Cong
infiltrators. Id. Subsequently, both Nemo and his handler were wounded.
Although Nemo lost his eye, he continued to serve out his term in Vietnam, and
is best known for saving his handler’s life. Id. On November 15, 2005, a
monument was dedicated to Nemo at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. See
WAR STORIES, supra note 379.
380. Bilger, supra note 1, at 50.
381. See interview with anonymous canine officer, supra note 300.
382. See id.
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increasingly complex human-animal fusion. Although the
surveillance context is a rather recent development in this
relationship, it nonetheless fits within the wider historical
context of breeding practices, the emergence of nationalism,
and scientific progress—to name just a few of the themes
that have influenced the current status of human-dog
relations.
B. K-9s and Electronic Drug Detectors
Alongside drug detection by dogs, the Guide for the
Selection of Drug Detectors for Law Enforcement
Applications383 lists several central drug detectors: trace
detection technologies384 (e.g., ion mobility spectrometry, or
IMS385), bulk detection,386 and manual search techniques.387
The guide compares trace and canine detection, concluding
that “[t]hese two screening methods tend to have
complementary strengths, so it is often advantageous to
have both capabilities on hand and to use either or both
383. The United States Department of Justice’s Office of Law Enforcement
Standards functions to “conduct research that will assist law enforcement and
criminal justice agencies in the selection and procurement of quality
equipment.” NIJ GUIDE, supra note 322, at iii.
384. Id. at 5. “Trace detection of an illicit drug refers to detecting the drug by
collection and analysis of microscopic amounts of the drug. These microscopic
quantities can be in the form of vapor, particulate, or both.” Id. “In principle,
dogs can be trained to detect any type of drug. This versatility, combined with a
dog’s superior mobility and its ability to follow a scent directly to the source,
makes canine detection the method of choice for a variety of applications that
have a significant search component.” Id. at 21.
385. Id. at 48. IMS “is a technique for the trace detection of drugs and other
chemical compounds. In this technique, compounds are first ionized and then
identified based on the time that it takes them to travel through a region with
an applied electric field.” Id. Mass spectrometry is “a chemical analysis
technique in which the molecules to be studied are first ionized and then
separated and identified based on their charge-to-mass ratio. Mass spectrometry
is performed under conditions of high vacuum in contrast to IMS which is
performed at atmospheric pressure.” Id.
386. Id. at 25. “In bulk detection, a contraband substance is detected not from
residual contamination but by the actual, macroscopic mass of the substance.”
Id.
387. Id. at 37. “Manual search, also referred to as physical search, is a
valuable contraband detection technique that can be used either alone or as a
supplement to other detection methods.” Id.
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depending upon the circumstances.”388 This demonstrates
that machine and dog are regarded by the police as
interdependent
and
inseparable.
Moreover,
new
technologies have been developed modeled on law
enforcement dogs so as to perform the same highly
specialized tasks.389 This strong dog-machine correlation
lends support to my argument that courts should treat
police dogs, similarly, as a technology.
In contrast, Mary Constantino treats dogs and
machines as two separate technologies, claiming that
“[r]ecently, technology has offered a replacement for man’s
best friend.”390 She continues: “By examining trace evidence,
technology can detect any number of illegal substances”
that even a dog would be unable to detect. 391 She
demonstrates that “[e]lectronic sniffers are becoming
increasingly popular in the law enforcement field. One of
the main reasons for this is the benefits they offer over the
traditional canine search.”392 Machines are preferable to
dogs for a variety of reasons; one reason is cost efficiency:
The cost of electronic sniffers, usually ranging between $20,000
and $100,000, is more expensive than a canine, which typically
costs between $3,000 and $10,000. However, the maintenance cost
of a canine is generally higher than that of an electronic sniffer.
With canines, it is necessary to train both the handler and the
dog. The cost of care for a canine generally adds another $1,600 to
the bill per year. This is not even including the salary for the
393
handler.

With regard to cost, “[t]he Federal Aviation Administration
has estimated that the cost of maintaining one properly
trained officer-canine team at a major U.S. airport is
approximately $165K per year.”394
388. Id. at 22.
389. See Lunney, supra note 37, at 896 (discussing the application of Kyllo and
the development of mechanical sniffers).
390. Mary Constantino, Electronic Sniffers’ Place: The Use of Electronic
Sniffers under the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment, 2
CHARLOTTE L. REV. 333, 335 (2010).
391. See id. at 335.
392. Id. at 345.
393. Id.; see also NIJ GUIDE, supra note 322, at 23 (discussing training costs).
394. NIJ GUIDE, supra note 322, at 23.
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Additionally, Constantino maintains that machines are
superior to dogs in that “a police dog can typically only work
one hour before requiring a break. Electronic sniffers do not
require breaks and ‘in principle, can operate 24 [hours] a
day.’”395 Also, “no matter how well trained the dog is, there
is a limit to how many types of drugs or explosives it can
detect. Most law enforcement agencies only train dogs to
detect the nine most common narcotics or explosives.”396 By
contrast, “electronic sniffers can detect a large selection of
narcotics, but also explosive and chemical agents. Another
benefit of electronic sniffers is that they typically do not
cause the same fear in individuals who are tested [as
opposed to canines].”397
At the same time, Constantino lists some of the
advantages in using traditional canines for police work. 398
For example, “[t]he main advantage a dog has over
electronic sniffers is its ability to trace a scent to its source.
A dog cannot only indicate whether molecular amounts of
drugs are present in the air but it also indicates the source
of the drugs,” which electronic sniffers cannot do.399 In effect,
canines are “the tool[s] of choice for law enforcement in
areas containing significant search components [which
cause an increase in the complexity of a search], meaning
that are they are unlikely” to be replaced by electronic
sniffers in the near future.400
The effectiveness of canine detection in real-world
settings is evident in the statistics generated by United
States Customs. According to these statistics, between
October 1996 and September 1997 canine detection led to
more than 9200 seizures of narcotics and other dangerous
drugs by the police.401 The seized materials were valued at
$3.1 billion, including 417,672 pounds of marijuana, 48,238
395. Constantino, supra note 390, at 345 (citations omitted).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 345-46.
398. Id. at 346.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 346.
401. Questions and Answers About the U.S. Customs Dogs, DOGPROBLEMS.COM,
http://www.dogproblems.com/uncategorized/questions-and-answers-about-theus-customs-dogs/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2012).
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pounds of cocaine, 335 pounds of hash oil, 326 pounds of
heroin, and 213 pounds of opium.402
C. K-9s—and Other Machines
Alongside my focus throughout this Article on the dog
itself as a fusion of technology and nature, the increasing
use of advanced technologies that are installed onto the
dogs’ bodies in the course of their routine police work also
renders the nature/machine split quite impractical for
assessing contemporary surveillance operations. Dogs are
increasingly becoming hybrid animal-machines—or, in
Donna Haraway’s terminology, cyborgs.403 For example,
some have speculated that a dog from the Navy Seal’s elite
dog
team—armored
with
high-level
machinery—
parachuted with eighty human members into Afghanistan
and was partly responsible for tracing Osama Bin Laden.404
Closer to home, a video from the Autonomous Canine
Navigation project shows a yellow Labrador moving through
a bomb site wearing a headset and harness, with a
402. Id.
403. “A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a
creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. . . . By the late
twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and
fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs.”
HARAWAY, supra note 197, at 149-50.
404. One reporter commented on the dog involved in the Bin Laden raid:
Little is known about what may be the nation’s most courageous dog.
Even its breed is the subject of great interest, although it was most
likely a German shepherd or a Belgian Malinois, military sources say.
But its use in the raid reflects the military’s growing dependence on
dogs in war, in which improvised explosive devices have caused twothirds of all casualties. Dogs have proved far better than people or
machines at quickly finding bombs.
Gardinier Harris, A Bin Laden Hunter on Four Legs, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2011,
at A16; see also A War Dog That Assisted in Assault on Bin Laden Might Have
Been Trained at Auburn, WAR EAGLE READER, (May 5, 2011), available at
http://www.thewareaglereader.com/2011/05/war-dog-that-assisted-in-assault-onbin-laden-might-have-been-trained-at-auburn/. The news item further reads:
“Suzanne Belger, president of the American Belgian Malinois Club, said she was
hoping the dog was one of her breed ‘and that it did its job and came home safe.’
But Laura Gilbert, corresponding secretary for the German Shepherd Dog Club
of America, said she was sure the dog was her breed ‘because we’re the best!’”
Harris, supra note 404.
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computer, a video camera, a GPS and an accelerator, all
operated remotely.405 And in New York City, police are
experimenting with a remotely monitored infrared video
camera mounted on a dog’s back. “The real technology here
is the dog,” one of the implementing officers said.406
CONCLUSION
Florida v. Jardines sits at an interesting junction
between two lines of precedents by the Court: Place,
Caballes, and Edmond—which establish that a dog sniff is
not a search—and Kyllo, Knotts, and Karo, which draw a
“firm but also bright” line at the entrance to the house.407
Soon, the Supreme Court Justices will need to decide which
line of cases more strongly applies in this case: will the
sanctity of the home trump centuries of dog-human
camaraderie?
On the one hand, the Court will want to avoid granting
K-9 police an absolute power to sniff around homes with no
need for warrants or reasonable suspicion and will also
want to be careful when using the products of such sniffs as
sufficient grounds for a valid search warrant. On the other
hand, the Court will want to use caution when interfering
with routine police detection work, especially in what is
perceived as a security-sensitive time. Although it has
received much less attention, another case from the
Sunshine State will soon be decided by the Supreme Court.
This case, which concerns the reliability of dog sniffs,
contests the Supreme Court’s previous assumption that the
dog is infallible.

405. Bilger, supra note 1, at 55; see Action Videos, K9 STORM INC.,
http://www.k9storm.com/video.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). For an idea
about the technological advancements used in the military, see Jennifer Viegas,
A U.S. Navy Seals’ Secret Weapon: Elite Dog Team, DISCOVERY NEWS (May 2,
2011, 6:47 PM), http://news.discovery.com/animals/a-us-navy-seals-secretweapon-elite-dog-team-110503.html; see also Winard Britt, A Software and
Hardware System for the Autonomous Control and Navigation of a Trained
Canine 27-28 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Auburn
University), available at http://etd.auburn.edu/etd/bitstream/handle/10415/1800/
Dissertation.pdf?sequence=1.
406. Bilger, supra note 1, at 56.
407. United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2000).
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This Article has presented an alternative framework for
deciding the two Florida cases. First, I have shown the
instability of the distinction between nature and technology
drawn by courts in their Fourth Amendment cases. As part
of this argument, I have also criticized the courts’ sui
generis approach toward dogs, first established in Place.
Unlike the machine, which is always suspected of being a
“creeping” surveillance technology, courts have often treated
the dog as innocuous and familiar and, hence, as incapable
of substantially intruding into human privacy.
The opposition between nature and technology, often
criticized by social theorists, is now before the Supreme
Court. The canine search cases invite the Court to develop a
more nuanced view of nature by acknowledging that a police
dog, although biological in many senses, is also manmade by
virtue of its breeding, training, deployment, and
interpretation by humans.
By contrast to the prevailing judicial classification of
the police dog as either a natural entity or a technology—
each triggering an opposite chain of legal events—I have
suggested treating the police dog as a “biotechnology,” a
technique of producing and using a biological entity that
requires considerable expertise and expense. Although it
seems that the dog has a limited development capacity in
comparison to the nonorganic machine, the police dog’s
improved breeding, training, application, and machine
augmentation render it both a biological entity and an
advancing technology.
Moreover, although the American public commonly uses
dogs as pets,408 a work dog—and a police detection dog in
particular—is clearly not “in public use.” Specifically, the
high cost of K-9 breeding and professional training, the
unique handler-canine relationship that develops in the
highly volatile police setting, and the status of K-9s as full
members of the police force—all demonstrate that the police
dog is not, and will probably never be, in such general
public use.

408. Indeed, according to a 2012 survey, 62% of United States households
owned a pet: 39% of households owned at least one dog and 33% of households
owned at least one cat. See Industry Statistics and Trends, AM. PET PRODUCTS
ASS'N,
http://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp
(last
visited June 2, 2012).
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Finally, this Article has argued that the hybrid category
of “biotechnology” should trigger at least as much
constitutional protection as an infrared device.409 Under no
circumstances should any technology go a-priori
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment, even when such
technology is an eight-year-old chocolate Labrador Retriever
named Franky.

409. In Place, Justice Brennan seemed to imply that due to the majority’s
rulings, we may need to be more concerned about dogs than technology. See
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 719-20 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“The use of dogs. . . . implicates concerns that are at least as sensitive as those
implicated by the use of certain [advanced technologies].”); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court . . .
may very well have paved the way for technology to override the limits of the
law . . . .”).

